【作者】 于竹丽；

【导师】 杜兴强；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 会计学， 2008， 博士

【副题名】基于中国证券市场的经验证据

【摘要】 我国证券监管部门从1993年开始要求上市公司在某些特定情况下对半年度财务报告进行审计,然而伴随着强制审计的产生,我国资本市场上也出现了半年报自愿审计的情况,这为我们直接检验审计需求以及审计对盈余管理的作用提供了有利契机。本文将上市公司分为三大类:再融资公司、ST公司以及其他公司,然后对这三类公司分别进行了相关的实证检验。本研究的实证研究结果发现:(1)再融资公司的自愿审计需求同第一大股东持股比例显著正相关,与公司业绩不相关,说明再融资公司进行半年报自愿审计主要是出于降低代理成本的需要,这能够支持代理假说。而公司规模越大的再融资公司,越不倾向于进行自愿审计,这说明该类公司并不需要通过自愿审计传递其财务报表信息可靠的信号,这与信号假说的推论相符合。此外,对于进行自愿审计的再融资公司,其盈余管理的程度显著低于未进行审计及进行了强制审计的上市公司。在控制了自选择问题之后,这一结论仍然成立。(2) ST公司的自愿审计需求与再融资公司的自愿审计需求并不一致。ST公司的自愿审计需求同第一大股东持股比例和公司规模显著负相关,同成长性显著正相关,这在一定程度上支持了审计需求的信号假说。但是没有证据能够支持ST公司进行自愿审计是出于代理假说的考虑。此外,ST公司自愿审计的公司在盈余管理程度上同未审计公司并无显著差别,强制审计也是如此,说明审计并没有发挥其抑制盈余管理的作用。(3)对于其他上市公司而言,报告了更高ROE的上市公司更有可能进行自愿审计,第一大股东持股比例同自愿审计需求呈“U”型关系,这些结果在一定程度上支持了审计需求的信号假说和代理假说。然而受到计量模型的限制,本文在对其他上市公司自愿审计质量的检验中并未得到可靠的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 While auditing of semi-annual reports is not mandatory in China except for a subset of firms in circumstances specified by the state regulator, a number of Chinese firms voluntarily purchase audits for their semi-annual reports. The Chinese stock market provides a unique institutional setting to investigate empirically why listed firms voluntarily have their financial reports audited and whether auditing detects and prevents earnings management.This dissertation firstly classes listed companies into three categories: refinancing companies, special treatment companies, and other listed companies. On the basis of classification, this dissertation separately examines the determinants of voluntary auditing of semiannual reports and the role of auditing on earnings management. This dissertation finds:(1) The decision of refinancing companies for semi-annual auditing is positively associated with the share ratio that the largest shareholder holds and negatively associated with size. The motivation for refinancing companies to hire an outside auditor can be explained with agency theory and signal theory. The extent of earnings management in the financial report voluntarily audited is lower than that in the financial report un-audited and mandatorily audited.(2)Unlike the refinancing companies, the special treatment companies’ decision for semi-annual auditing is negatively associated with the share ratio that the largest shareholder holds and size, but positively associated with growth, which means that the major reason for special treatment companies to hire an outside auditor is to signal to the users of financial reporting. There is no significant difference between voluntarily audited report and un-audited report, nor between mandatorily audited report and un-audited report, which leads to the conclusion that auditing drops its effect for preventing earnings management in special treatment companies.(3) The decision of other listed companies for semi-annual auditing is positively associated with ROE, again supporting signaling hypothesis for auditing demand. Besides this, there is an U shaped relation between voluntary audit and the share ratio that the largest shareholder holds. Because of statistical constrain, the role of audit on earnings management in other listed companies cannot be examined precisely.更多还原