【作者】 施文泼；

【导师】 张馨；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 法律经济学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 违约责任制度是合同法中最复杂、最核心的问题。对违约责任的经济分析一直是法律经济学研究的热点问题之一。现有法律经济学文献主要通过分析不同违约责任形式对买卖双方的违约行为、信赖投资行为和预防行为的影响,试图找到最优的违约责任形式。本文在全面梳理和总结现有研究文献的基础上,进一步分析了合同法中与违约责任制度紧密相关的另外两个基本制度——期前违约制度和同时履行抗辩权制度对违约责任制度行为激励作用的影响。这对合同法的经济学研究,具有重要的理论意义。我国一直到1999年的《合同法》才引入了期前违约制度和同时履行抗辩权制度,但在制度的具体规定上仍然显得十分粗糙且缺乏可操作性,本文对这两种制度的经济分析对我国合同法的完善也具有实践指导价值。全文共分六章。第一章阐述了论文的选题背景和写作意义,并对论文的研究范围进行了界定。第二章对对相关研究成果进行了回顾。第三章建立了一个违约责任制度的基本经济模型,重点考察了不同违约责任形式对当事人的违约、信赖和预防行为的影响。第四章将合同违约责任的行为效应分析拓展到期前违约情形,并对两种不同的期前违约救济规则进行了比较分析。第五章研究了双务合同特有的同时履行抗辩权制度对当事人的行为决定的影响。第六章是一个简要结论。本论文的理论分析得到了两个基本结论:第一,本文将合同违约责任的行为效应分析拓展到期前违约情形,并对两种不同的期前违约救济规则进行了比较分析。分析结果表明,期前违约制度增加了允诺人的违约水平,但减少了受诺人的信赖水平。与英国规则相比,在美国规则下,允诺人的违约水平增加得更多,但受诺人的信赖水平减少得也更多。第二,同时履行抗辩权制度同样对当事人的行为激励造成了扭曲。在一般的违约责任形式下,引入同时履行抗辩权制度导致了双方当事人的违约水平下降,同时降低了他们进行信赖投资的激励。更多还原

【Abstract】 The institution of contract remedies is the kernel and the most complicated issue of contract law. Economic analysis of contract remedies is always one of the hotest issues in the law and economics studies. The existing law and economics literature attempts to identify the optimal contract remedy through analyzing the effects of various remedies on the contract parties’ breach behavior, reliance investments and precaution investments. Based on a thoroughly review of existing literature, this dissertation further studies the effects of the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract and the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus, which are the other two basic institution in contract law, on the behavioral incentives of contract remedies. This study is of great theorical significance for economic study of contract law.The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract and the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus are introduced into contract law of China until 1999, and the concrete clauses of these two institutions are very rough and hard to be applied in civil procedure. An economic analysis of them would be of great significance in promoting the improvment of contract law of China, too.This dissertation includes six chapters. Chapter one discusses the studying background and the significance of the topic, and defines the studying scope. Chapter two reviews the related literatures. Chapter three establishes a basic economic model of contract remedies, focusing on the effects of various contract remedies on the parties’ breach, reliance and precaution decisions. Chapter four extends the former analysis to the case of anticipatory breach of contract and compares two different doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract. Chapter five studies the behavioral effects of the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus in bilateral contracts. Chapter six is a conclusion.There are two main conclusions of this dissertation:First, this dissertation extends the behavioral effect analysis of contract remedies into the situation of anticipatory breach of contract and compares two different doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract. The resultes demonstrate that the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract increases the level of the promisor’s breach of contract, while it decreases the promisee’s reliance investments. Compared to English rule, the promisor breaches the contract more and the promisee’s reliance investments decreseas more under American rule.Second, the institution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus distorts the behavioral incentives of the contract parties too.Under the routine remedy for breach of contract, the mtrodution of exceptio non adimpleti contractus decreases the level of the parties’ breach and their incentives to invest in reliance both.更多还原