【作者】 胡旭阳；

【导师】 史晋川；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 政治经济学， 2008， 博士

【副题名】基于法与金融视角的研究

【摘要】 随着我国民营经济的发展、壮大,民营经济对我国社会经济转型产生日益重要的影响。已有关于转轨制度安排与民营经济发展的研究文献,从不同角度深入分析了转轨制度环境对民营经济发展和社会转型的影响,然而,从投资者保护角度分析制度环境对民营企业投资行为影响,进而从微观角度揭示民营企业转型对我国社会经济转型影响的相关文献仍旧不多。针对我国民营企业发展所处的产权保护环境,本文尝试以法与金融学作为研究的切入视角和指引,着重分析投资者法律保护和转轨条件下投资者法律保护替代机制的制度环境对民营企业多元化投资动因的影响,以及在上述制度环境下民营企业多元化对我国经济社会转型的影响。在对相关文献进行评述的基础上,本文首先考察了我国投资者法律保护和民营企业产权保护现状,然后进一步分析我国投资者法律保护不充分的制度环境对民营企业多元化投资动因和多元化民营企业公司治理结构的影响。理论模型的分析表明,投资者法律保护不充分的制度环境将促进民营企业进行多元化投资,并且投资者法律保护不充分的制度环境还促使多元化民营企业在公司治理结构上趋于家族化和企业组织形式趋于选择金字塔股权结构。其次,本文分析了转轨条件下投资者法律保护替代机制与民营企业多元化投资之间的关系。法与金融学强调在投资者法律保护不充分的情况下,法律替代机制会发挥作用,而本文则着重分析在我国转轨条件下民营企业的政治关联作为法律替代机制的影响。作为投资者法律保护替代机制,通过与政府建立良好的关系,民营企业的政治关联保护了民营企业的权益,而且民营企业的政治关联与民营企业多元化投资之间存在互动关系:一方面,民营企业的政治关联便于民营企业获取政府掌控的资源,进而促进民营企业的多元化投资;另一方面,在地方政府官员的政绩驱动和晋升政治锦标赛激励下,民营企业多元化投资可以扩大企业规模或满足政府的产业政策偏好,从而有助于建立民营企业的政治关联。而经验证据也支持上述关于民营企业的政治关联与民营企业多元化投资关系的理论假说。最后,本文以案例的方式分析了民营企业多元化对我国社会经济转型带来的影响。投资者法律保护不充分和民营企业的作为法律保护替代机制的制度环境,一方面,通过促进多元化而影响民营企业的成长;另一方面,也使部分民营企业发展成为家族控制的、具有政治影响力的多元化民营企业集团。而本文的案例分析表明,这些多元化民营企业集团为了自身的利益而展开政策游说活动,利用企业政治影响力影响政府政策的制定,从而对我国社会经济转型产生重要影响。综上所述,以法与金融学强调的投资者法律保护与法律替代机制为指引,本文分析了投资者法律保护不充分的制度环境和转轨条件下的特殊替代机制——民营企业的政治关联一对民营企业多元化动因和多元化后果的影响。本文的研究,一方面,有助于增进人们对中国转轨过程中的制度环境影响民营企业发展和社会经济转型的微观作用机制的理解,为研究转轨过程中的制度环境影响企业投资行为进行影响我国社会经济转型提供了一个新视角;另一方面,通过民营企业多元化投资的研究有助于为法与金融学相关理论命题检验提供转轨背景下的经验证据。更多还原

【Abstract】 Although many researchers concern about the relationship between institution arrangement in Chinese economy transition and the rapid development of Chinese non-state sectors, little literature has pay enough attention to the effect of institution contexts on the Chinese private enterprises’ investment behavior which has significant impact on the transformation of private enterprises from the paradigm of Law and finance.According to the private property protection context which Chinese private enterprises confronts with, based on the paradigm of Law and finance, the thesis attempt to analyze the relationship between investor protection and substitution mechanisms of investor protection in Chinese economy transition and the motivation and consequence to diversify of Chinese private enterprises.To begin with, on the basis of the investigation about the current status of investor protection and property protection for private enterprises in China, the thesis puts up a model to interpret the effect of investor protection on the motivation to diversify of private enterprises. The result shows that, ineffective investor protection will promote private enterprises to diversify, and also has significant effect on the corporate governance structure and organization forms of diversified private firms.Because law and finance emphasizes on substitution mechanism when law can’t protect investors from being expropriated, the thesis investigates the relationship between the substitution mechanism of investor protection in Chinese economy transition and the diversification of private enterprises. The thesis puts forward argument that political connection is a very important substitution mechanism of investor protection for the private enterprise in China. Political connection helps private enterprises maintain good relationship with government administration, which will protect private enterprises from being expropriated. Then, the thesis exploits the relationships between political connection and the diversification of Chinese private enterprises, and argues that, they have impact on each other: on the one side, political connection promotes private enterprises to diversify because political connection facilitates private enterprises to gain the resources which are necessary for firms to diversify, however which is controlled by government; on the other side, under the conditions of that local officials are constrained by political champion, the diversification of private enterprises can enlarge firm’s scale and enter into industries which government go after, which help private enterprises to set up good relationship with government. The thesis also provides empirical evidence which accord with the above arguments.Finally, the thesis analyzes the effect of diversification of private enterprises on Chinese economy and society transition by case study. Ineffective investor protection and political connection as substitution mechanism promote private enterprises to diversify, at the same time, help some private enterprises develop into family-controlled, politically-connected, diversified groups, which are of intensive political influence. The results of case study show, such diversified private groups exert their influence to lobby.In all, based on the paradigm of law and finance, the thesis studies the effect of investor protection and its substitution mechanism in Chinese economy transition context on the motivation of private enterprises to diversify and its consequence. On the one side, the thesis shows insights into the micro-mechanism that institutional contexts of Chinese economy transition influence the transformation of private enterprises; on the other side, the thesis also provides empirical evidence to test some arguments of law and finance.更多还原