【作者】 过琥岗；

【导师】 刘少波；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 金融学， 2008， 博士

【摘要】 上市公司中公司所有权与经营权的分离使企业制度内部产生了所有者与经理层之间的委托——代理关系,研究通过有效的报酬设计体制来约束和吸引经理人做出有利于企业长远发展的决定具有更为重要的现实意义。结合中国特殊的背景条件,本文展开对中国上市公司高级经理人报酬激励机制展开研究。对高级经理人激励通常包括物质激励和非物质激励两种,本研究只关注通过报酬(即物质激励部分)对高管进行激励的有效性研究。从定量和定性两个方面回答了哪些因素会影响到高管报酬、对高管报酬进行设计是否能提高上市公司业绩、怎样的报酬系统对高管而言最合理等问题。对于高管报酬激励有效性研究首先要确定高管报酬的提高是否能够提高上市公司业绩,然后再回答怎样对高管进行激励的问题。本研究运用中国上市公司数据进行实证检验,结果表明高管的年度收入与上市公司绩效存在正相关关系,而影响高管年度收入的因素有上市公司市场表现、盈利能力提高程度、行业中同类企业相对绩效、上市公司规模与第一大股东持股比例;在第一大股东为国有股、机构投资者两种情况下,上市公司经理人年度收入与公司绩效间的正向关系加强。实证结果显示高管持股比例大小并不会影响上市公司业绩。这一结果与国外上市公司主要通过持股激励高管的事实相悖,为此本文进一步运用博弈论方法证明在中国特定情况下固定报酬体系并不一定总是无效率的。最后,结合上述分析结果与国外经理人报酬激励发展实务,本文针对如何增加中国经理人报酬激励的有效性提出相关的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The separation of the ownership and operation of listed companies creates agency problems between owners and managers, it is important to design effective compensation system to make managers work for companies’ long-term benefit. Considering the special circumstance of China, we start research on Chinese Public Listed Companies’ Executive Compensation and Incentive Mechanism.Normally, executive incentives include money incentives and non-money incentives. Our study only focuses on money incentives. By both quantitative and qualitative analysis, our study answers that which factors can affect executive compensation, if current executive incentive can affect listed companies’ performances, and how to design an optimized incentive mechanism.To study the effectiveness of executive incentive mechanism, the priority is to test if higher executive compensations can create better companies’ performance. The further analysis is how to design the effective incentive mechanism. Our study have the empirical tests on Chinese listed companies’ data, and get the results of that executive income have positive correlation with listed companies’ performance, and listed companies’ market performance, profitability, relative performance in industry, size, and holding of biggest shareholder can affect executive annual income.Multiple factors are proved to affect executive holding companies’ share, however, we cannot find the managers’ holding of companies’ share can affect listed companies’ performance. This result is quite conflict with the realities of foreign listed companies. To clarify the difference, we use game theory get the result that fixed compensation can be effective in special circumstance, such as current Chinese economy.Combine the results above with the update status of executive compensation abroad; we have summarized multiple recommendations to increase the effectiveness of Chinese listed companies’ executive compensation mechanism.更多还原