【作者】 王华平；

【导师】 盛晓明；

【作者基本信息】 浙江大学 ， 外国哲学， 2008， 博士

【副题名】一种知觉哲学的考察

【摘要】 心灵与世界的问题,是一个古老而又反复不断地被讨论的问题。广义地,它包含了所有和心灵与世界相关的问题。本文关心的是它们之间的知觉关系和理性关系的问题。这里所说的知觉关系是指由知觉经验所确立的认知者与他所处环境之间的关系,理性关系则指世界对心灵所持有的关于世界的思想所施加的合理性限制。第一个问题涉及知觉的对象和知觉意识。第二个问题追问的是,知觉经验要能起到知识辩护的作用,它必须具有什么样的性质?就第一个问题而言,哲学史上最有名的方案是间接实在论。文章对间接实在论的主要论据进行了梳理和反驳,指出它会导致“知觉之幕”的问题。接下来探讨了当前最有影响的两种形式的直接实在论:知觉意向论和析取论。意向论很好地解决了幻觉对象的非存在性问题,但它无法一致地解释意向状态和意向对象的关系。这将我们引向析取论。析取论认为幻觉和真实知觉根本就是不同基本类型的心理状态。从而,知觉经验便是幻觉和真实知觉经验的析取。析取论彻底解决了“知觉之幕”的问题,它让心灵与世界之间的通道变得畅通无阻起来。在此基础上,文章为著名的“缸中脑”问题提供了一个整体式的反“证据怀疑论”论证。接下来是知觉意识的问题。文章对著名的知觉信念论和判断论进行了反驳,获得的结论是,信念和判断不属于知觉意识。有关知觉意识的分析结果可以对科学哲学中的一些问题起到澄清作用。文章论证了,科学哲学中的“观察渗透理论”论题其实只在很有限的情况下才成立,它完全不足以让库恩得出现象论的结论。文章还说明了,知觉意识不只是包含有与特定视角有关的关于环境事物的内容,而且还可以有普遍性的内容。这有助于我们理解知识的普遍性,同时也挑战了地方性知识的说法。文章所关心的第二个问题其实是知觉经验与知觉信念的理性关系问题。传统经验论在说明这一点时陷入了“所予的神话”。作为替代方案,融贯论却切断了它们之间的理性联系。最小经验论坚持认为它们可以具有理性关系。一种使得最小经验论成为可能的著名方案是概念论。概念论认为经验内容从一开始就是概念的。但这会遇到经验的细致性和动物知觉的问题。为此,文章论证了共存论题,即概念内容和非概念内容可以在同一种知觉经验中共存。这一点,借助于心理学中著名的概念原型理论可以很好地得到说明。另外,承认经验的非概念内容并不会导致“所予的神话”,因为处在“理性空间”之外的东西,仍然能在“辩护空间”中发挥认识论作用。于是,理性关系何以可能的问题得到了说明。更多还原

【Abstract】 The mind-world question is an old and repeatedly discussed problem. In the broad sense, it includes all the problems concerning mind and world. This dissertation focuses on the perceptual relation and the rational relation between them. Here, perceptual relation refers to the relation any cognizer has between him and his environment in virtue of his possession of perceptual experience, and rational relation is the relation in virtue of which thoughts, conceived by mind and directed to world, receive rational constraints imposed by world. The first question involves the object of perception and perceptual consciousness. The second one is to investigate the nature of perceptual experience so far as it can serve justificatory role for knowledge.As to the first problem, the most famous reply to it is indirect realism. This dissertation sorts out five main arguments for indirect realism and counters them piecemeal. It also makes clear that indirect realism inevitably leads to the "veil of perception" problem. The dissertation then turns to the discussion of intentionalism and disjunctivism. Intentionalism well explains the nonexistence of the object of hallucination, but it cannot coherently account for the relationship of intentional state and intentional object. This inconsistency leads us to disjunctivism. Disjunctivism takes hallucination and verdict perception as two fundamentally different kind of mental state. Therefore, perceptual experience is a disjunction of hallucinatory and verdict perceptual experience. Disjunctivism solves the "veil of perception" problem completely, and makes straightway the passage between mind and world. Based on disjunctivism, this dissertation proposes a holistic version of argument against "evidential skepticism".The next chapter is about to discuss perceptual consciousness. The first two sections argue against the belief theory of perception and the judgment theory of perception. Then varieties of seeing are analyzed in the name of perceptual consciousness, and the results are applied to clarify some theses in philosophy of science. This dissertation argues that the thesis that observation is "theory-laden" is tenable only in very limited cases, and that it does not have enough supportive force for Kuhn to draw his phenomenalistic conclusions from it. It is also shown that there are not only particular features but also universal features about environment in perceptual consciousness. This helps us to understand why knowledge is universal. So contexrualism about knowledge is challenged.The second problem is actually about the relationship between perceptual experience and perceptual belief. Traditional empiricism cannot give an adequate account for this point, and therein falls into "the myth of the given". While coherentism as an alternative just cuts off the rational relation between experience and belief. Minimal empiricism insists on the rational relation. It has been famously argued that if minimal is possible, then experience must has conceptual content. Call this conceptualism. Conceptualism cannot give adequate account for the fine-grainedness of experience and animal’s perception. The dissertation proposes coexist thesis, which states that conceptual content and nonconceptual content can coexist in a perceptual experience. Coexist thesis can be well understood in light of prototype theory in psychology. Our commitment to nonconceptual content will not lead to "the myth of the given", because it can play justificatory role in virtue of its being in "space of justification", though it is out of "space of reasons". Therefore, there is no problem lies in rational relation between mind and world.更多还原