【作者】 黄勇民；

【导师】 杜金岷；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 金融学， 2007， 博士

【副题名】基于公司特征、证券设计与治理绩效的分析框架

【摘要】 理论上，可转债融资具有降低外部融资成本和改善特定类型公司治理绩效的作用。本文采用规范分析和实证分析相对结合和先破后立的方法，首先从理论上探讨和总结了可转债降低外部融资成本和改善特定类型公司治理绩效的作用机制和途径。在此基础上，改进和拓展现有研究的“公司特征—发行宣告股价效应”分析范式，建立一个“公司特征—条款设计—治理绩效”相互印证的的分析框架，对我国可转债融资选择行为和效果进行了全面的研究和刻画，由此提出我国可转债融资选择的动机，并从“宏观环境—市场运行机制—公司治理”三个制度层面对这种动机的存在及其形成机制进行系统分析和阐释。研究发现：我国可转债发行人的公司特征主要表现为具有较低的负债率、较低的成长性和收益波动性、较少的自由现金流量、较大的资产规模和实物资产比例，与理论预期特征并不相符。由于发行人没有重视自身的成长性和风险特征，可转债融资并没有得到大多数发行人的合理选择。我国可转债的条款设计不仅具有很强的雷同性，而且没有起到合理传递理论预期的特定融资代理问题和信息不对称问题的信号关系，甚至传递了相反的信号关系，可转债具有很强的偏股性。发行人忽视可转债的衍生性和条款设计的灵活性对特定类型公司外部融资成本和治理效应的影响，条款设计主要体现了发行人规避财务危机风险的要求和“内部人”控制权利益最大化的要求。我国可转债融资并没有起到理论预期的降低公司外部融资成本和改善特定类型公司治理绩效的作用，可转债发行后的公司治理绩效在平均上出现较为明显的恶化。值得关注的是，不管如何划分样本，可转债融资公司的主营业务增长率始终保持显著的正增长，但是公司的息税折旧摊销前报酬率、总资产报酬率和主营业务资产报酬率都出现了较为明显的下降和负增长。这种成长性更多的体现了公司“内部人”通过业务和资产规模的扩张实现自身利益的最大化，没有证据表明它对公司的整体绩效具有促进的作用。尽管我国可转债融资具有改善高财务杠杆公司治理绩效的作用，但由于发行人的资产负债率普遍很低，这种作用实际上是非常有限的。现有关于可转债融资选择的理论模型和假说不能解释我国的可转债融资选择行为，基于包括公司控股股东和管理者“内部人”控制权利益最大化的“股权融资替代”是我国可转债融资选择的重要动机和主要解释。这种融资动机不能简单地归因于股权结构二元性所导致的“内部人控制”问题，它实际上是发行人在多方面制度性缺陷综合激励下的一种“理性”选择。为改变这种非理性的融资动机，促进我国可转债市场健康发展，一方面监管部门要改进和完善相应的制度、政策，除了公司治理方面的缺陷需要完善以外，监管制度和市场运行机制方面存在着多方面制度安排上的显著缺陷和现实可行的改进空间；另一方面发行人应对制度的变迁及其激励与约束机制具有良好的理性预期，树立全面的融资成本观、长期绩效观和利益相关者价值最大化的治理观，重视自身治理结构的完善，并根据自身特定的代理问题和风险特征，合理选择可转债融资，并重视条款设计的灵活性和信号传递功能。更多还原

【Abstract】 In theory, convertible bond (CB) financing have a function to lower issuance costs andimprove the governance performance for specific issuers. By applying the method ofnormative analysis and empirical research, this dissertation probe firstly into thetheoretical mechanism and approach of this function. Then, the author makes ameliorationto the analysis paradigm used by lots of formerly studies that based on ’firm features-stockmarkets reaction to announcements of issues’, establishes an improved analysisframework based on interdependent ’firm features-security design-governanceperformance’. Rest on the improved framework, this dissertation studies and depicts thechoice behavior and effect of CB financing in China, puts forward the motivation ofChinese issuers and tries to explain this motivation from the given institutionalarrangement. The results of this dissertation suggest thatCB issuers are low leveraged, big firms with short growth opportunities, low volatilityof operating incomes, small free cash flow and high assets-in-place. The firm features ofissuers are inconsistent with theoretical expectation. Because most of issuers ignore theirgrowing features and specific risk exposure, convertible bond financing was chosenirrationally in China.Security design are strong similar, the clauses of CB don’t signal rationally specificallyagent problem and information asymmetry problem that the issuers have to face, butsignal reversed information to some extent. Most of issuers ignore the derivativecharacteristic of CB and its flexibility design to accommodate specific financing problem.The aims of security design are strong likely to offer an equity-like CB that meet theissuer’s request of avoiding financial distress, as well as maximizing private benefits of’insider control’.Firms on average have a remarkable decline in the governance performance followingthe CB offering, the function of minimizing external financing costs and improving thegovernance performance for specific issuers actually doesn’t exist in China. The problemwe should pay close attention is that, however the samples be plot, the main operatinggrowth ratios of issuers significantly goes up. Otherwise, the operating income relative toassets (EBITDA/assets)/retum on total assets (ROA)/profit margins (CROA) of issuerssignificantly declines respectively; some of these indexes even have a negative growth.The author considers that this main operating growth embodies the expansion in issuer’sbusiness and sizes so as to maximizing private benefits of ’insider control’, there are noevidence this growth make any good help to the issuer’s governance performance.Although CB financing help improving highly leveraged issuer’s performance in a certain extent, but this effect is every limit because most of the issuers arc low leveraged firms.On the whole, the existing theoretical models and hypothesizes can’t explain thechoice of CB in china. Convertible bond as a simple equity substitute so as to maximizingprivate benefits of ’insider control’ is the issuers’ motivation and main explanation inChina, where the ’insider’ might include finn’s controlling shareholder and managers.This financing motivation can’t be simply attributed to the dual characteristics ofownership structure in Chinese listed companies, it actually embodies the issuers ’rational’selection under comprehensive incentives from a series of institutional arrangement. Inorder to transform this irrational financing motivation, on the one hand, the supervisiondepartments should mend or perfect relative institutions and policies. In addition to theinstitutional defect on the corporate governance that need improve, there are some visibleinstitutional defects that can be improved practically on the supervisory system, marketperforming system, etc. On the other hand, the issuers should have rational expectationsabout the institutional and its restriction mechanism changes; set up the views ofcomprehensive financing cost, views of long-run governance performance and views ofstakeholder’s governance. Furthermore, issuer who choice CB as a external financinginstrument should match his own specific agent problem and risk exposure with the givenfinancing pattern, and do attach importance to the signal function of CB’s clauses and itsflexibility design accommodating specific financing motivation in security design.更多还原