【作者】 安凡所；

【导师】 张炳申；

【作者基本信息】 暨南大学 ， 产业经济学， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 本文首先对经理人的性质作了探讨，并且将经理人与企业家的概念区分开来。由于经理人市场契约难题的存在和经理人市场交易关系的特殊性，经理人的锦标竞赛和内部劳动力市场在一定意义上缓解了经理人市场的契约难题。本文重点研究了董事会的功能定位，通过对董事会模式的比较发现：我国立法实践中明显过于强调董事会的决策控制职能，而没有对董事会监督控制职能予以足够的重视，而这有可能妨碍董事会在总经理更替决策中有效性的发挥。在文献回顾的基础上，本文以2002-2004年间我国A股上市公司为研究对象，采用LOGISTIC回归分析方法，实证研究了上市公司总经理更替和继任选择的影响因素，本文发现：1．我国上市公司总经理更替受企业绩效的影响非常显著，企业绩效越差，总经理更替的可能性越大。2．董事会领导权结构影响了董事会在总经理更替中有效性的发挥，在两职合一的条件下，董事会难以更替不称职的总经理。3．我国上市公司独立董事比例的上升并没有提高董事会在总经理更替中的有效性，独立董事还基本不能发挥监督控制作用。4．我国上市公司总经理的继任选择与公司绩效相关，公司绩效越差，继任总经理外部聘任的可能性越大。5．我国上市公司总经理的继任选择与董事会特征变量不存在相关性。本文的研究结果表明：我国上市公司董事会在总经理更替和继任选择中没有充分发挥有效的作用，上市公司存在明显的“弱”董事会和“弱”独立董事问题。本文最后分析了这一问题产生的原因并提出了相应的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 We first study the. definition of professional manager by comparing the concept of professional manager and entrepreneur. Tournament and internal labor market alleviate. contract problem to some degree in managerial market. We study the function of the board of directors, and find the neglect of supervisory-control function in China legal practice hinders the effectiveness of the board of directors in the course of CEO turnover.After an brief literature review, we analyze the selected samples of China listed companies in A stock with Logistic regression, and get the following results that affect CEO turnover and succession:1. CEO turnover is obviously affected by firm performance, the worse the firm performance, the more frequent the CEO turnover.2. Leadership structure affect the effectiveness of the board of directors in CEO turnover, CEO duality hinder the turnover of CEO.3. Rising the percentage of independent directors does not improve the effectiveness of the board of directors in CEO turnover, independent directors can not function their supervisory responsibilities well in China listed companies..4. CEO succession is related to firm performance, the worse the firm performance, the more frequent the CEO outside hiring.5. There is no relationship between CEO succession and the features of the board of directors.This study indicates that the board of directors do not function well in CEO turnover and succession in China listed companies, and there are "weak" board of directors and "weak" independent directors. We analyze the reasons and supply relevant. suggestions in the end.更多还原