【作者】 洪名勇；

【导师】 施国庆；

【作者基本信息】 河海大学 ， 技术经济及管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 习俗元制度作为一种自发的内在制度安排，不仅存在于“习俗经济”之中，而且广泛存在于现代市场经济中。人类经济行为不仅受市场机制这只看不见的手和政府这只看得见的手支配着，而且还受到另一只看不见的手，即习俗的调节。人们生活在习俗的世界里，尤其是农村居民更是如此。农地习俗一般是在人们相互博弈中形成的，得到社区绝大多数人的认可，因此，农地习俗常常是社区内相关当事人自我实施的。在新制度经济学家看来，制度实施是极为重要的，有制度不实施往往比没有制度更糟糕。基于此，通过对蕴藏马克思、康芒斯、穆勒、马歇尔等人经典著作的农地习俗元制度思想进行梳理以及查阅其他相关文献、实地调查以及博弈分析等多种方法，本文在对习俗元制度这只看不见的手作用原理、演化机制进行探讨基础上，对农地习俗元制度及其实施机制进行了研究，研究的主要内容和结论如下：第一，市场的有效运行不仅只有市场机制这只看不见的手，而且习俗元制度作为另一只看不见的手，对人们的选择及其他经济行为具有极为重要的调节作用。习俗元制度具有相对稳定性、广泛的群众性和外在的强制性、默认性、可塑性，从演化经济学的视角来年，习俗元制度的演化机制至少有：遗传机制(复制机制)、变异机制(新奇创生机制)、选择机制和适用性学习机制。文化与习俗之间的关系是复杂的，一方面，习俗元制度本身承载和保持着文化；另一方面，文化作为习俗元制度等制度的“精神性”，又成为习俗元制度遗传、演化和变迁中的连续性的“基因”。“文化拟子”是理解文化濡化机制和文化播化机制的关键，习俗元制度的演化也是以“拟子”为基础，通过濡化机制和播化机制进行的。第二，对蕴藏马克思、康芒斯、穆勒、马歇尔等人经典著作中的农地产权习俗起源理论、农地流转习俗、农地继承习俗、农地习俗元制度对租赁制度、农地价格等思想进行梳理，马克思的农地习俗元制度理论对于今天我们研究农地习俗具有重要指导意义，同时对日耳曼、法国以及中国传统社会中存在的农地习俗元制度进行了考察。第三，农地习俗元制度是最基本的农地制度分析单位，同时也是最为古老、存在时间最长的农地制度，以其反映农地产权规则、自我实施合同、第三方实施以及组织规则等农地制度的某些重要方面，包括农地面积计量习俗、农地产权习俗、农地流转习俗等等。农地习俗元制度对传统社会和现代社会中的农地产权制度均具有重要影响。由于我国不同地区自然、地理、文化、民族及经济发展水平的多样性与差异性，导致了农地习俗元制度的多样性与差异性。第四，农地习俗产权元制度是极为重要的农地习俗元制度安排。权利或者产权与习俗之间具有较为紧密的联系，习俗不仅是产权的来源，而且产权本身就是习俗进一步演进的结果，或者说产权是习俗的制度化。马克思在《资本论》、恩格斯在《家庭、私有制和国家的起源》等经典著作中也对文明社会之前的产权制度进行了深入研究，从而形成了马克思、恩格斯关于习俗产权的有关理论。农地习俗产权的起源可以通过一个简单的博弈模型来得到说明，该模型表明在没有第三方设计的条件下，我们如何在土地资源稀缺的情况下自组织成一种互惠互利的习俗元产权制度。同时，经验研究的结果不仅对这一理论模型提供了某种程度的支持，而且也有助于我们更好地理解农地习俗产权元制度的起源。第五，农地习俗元制度的实施机制主要包括自我实施机制和第三方参与下的实施机制两种，而影响农地习俗元制度实施机制的因素是多种多样的，这些因素对农地习俗元制度的实施机制的影响可以从多视角、多层面进行分析。对此，笔者建立了一个整体性的分析框架来进行探讨。第六，在农村农地流转过程中，由于多数农地流转没有签订书面契约，一般都是口头契约，因此，就农地流转双方来讲，自己守信和信任对方对于农地流转契约的有效实施是至关重要的。本文引入重复博弈模型分析了农地流转过程中农户之间信任的形成机理。信任是市场经济得以健康运转的基石，信任对农地租赁市场的运行是不可缺少的，但在农地租市场上，信任又是难以观察和计量的。实验经济学的有关研究成果有助于这一难题的解决，引入实验经济学的研究表明：在农地租赁过程中，不同租赁双方之间的信任度是不一样的，信任度的差异不仅影响了当期租赁契约的选择，而且还会对今后的租赁行为及租赁制度的实施产生影响；同时，信任还与租赁价格有关，出租人所要求的租金与承租人的信任度呈明显的负相关关系；较高的信任度对于农地租赁市场的高效率运行具有积极作用。同时，本文还从信任博弈的视角分析了农户之间口头契约能够自我实施的机制。第七，农地习俗元制度的实施是需要有关经济主体的参与才能顺利进行的，农地习俗元制度之所能够自我实施，一个重要的方面就在于有关当事人对自己声誉的看重，即声誉机制有效地促进了农地习俗元制度的自我实施。重复博弈的KMRW定理表明，尽管每一农户在选择承认其他农户农地习俗产权(合作)时冒着被其他农户不承认自己农地习俗产权(不合作)的风险，但如果自己选择不合作，就暴露了自己是非合作型的，从而失去了获得长期合作收益的可能(如果对方是合作型的)。如果博弈重复的次数足够多，未来收益就会超过短期收益，因此，即使某一农户在本性上并不是合作型的，但在博弈开始，每一个参与农户都想树立一个合作形象，使对方认为自己是喜欢合作的；只有在博弈快要结束时，参与农户才可能一次性地把自己建立的声誉用尽，合作才会停止。从关联博弈的视角来看，农地租赁主体之间的关系是基于血缘关系、有限地缘关系的信任关系，在一个博弈域的策略选择不仅影响自己本博弈中的得益，而且还会影响自己的声誉，声誉作为一种社会资本，会影响其在相关博弈域中的策略选择，因此村庄内的农地租赁博弈有效的嵌入到其赖以生存的社区交换域的重复博弈，并且其交易域和社区交换域基本重叠，信息完全性与信号传递效率高，使得关联博弈的关联度强，交易域和社区交换域双重惩罚机制的可置信度高，农地租赁习俗中的违约者的违约成本高(因为违约现时受益的贴现因子很大)，上述博弈的纳什均衡解就会是(出租，守约)，而嵌入社会交换域中的关联博弈的演化稳定策略将会是(合作，合作)，从而实现农地习俗元制度实施的良性循环。第八，与其他制度实施有收益、成本一样，不管是农地习俗元制度的自我实施，还是第三方参与的实施，我们都可以通过制度实施的成本与收益进行分析。对于有关主体而言，是否实施制度标准是收益与成本的比较，在本文中，我们特别强调心理收益与心理成本对制度实施的影响。第九，农地习俗元制度的实施也可以从惩罚的视角来分析。从惩罚实施的主体来看，惩罚主要有自我惩罚和他人惩罚两种形式，如果从惩罚的视角来进行分析，农地习俗元制度的实施机制可以分为通过自我惩罚的自我实施机制和通过第三方惩罚的实施机制。农地习俗元制度之所能够自我实施机制，有两种机制在起作用：一是自我强化机制，二是自我纠错机制或者称为自我惩罚机制。同时，经济主体具有机会主义行为倾向，使得自我惩罚机制并不能够完全保证农地习俗元制度的自我实施，因此，第三方参与、并实施惩罚的实施机制对于农地习俗元制度的实施具有重要意义。更多还原

【Abstract】 As a spontaneous internal institutional arrangements ,custom proto- institution is not limited to the "the custom economy", but there is widespread in the modern market economy. Human economic behavior is controled not only by the invisible hand of market mechanism and the governmental allocation of this visible, but by the invisible hand of another, that is the custom adjustment. People have lived in the world of custom, especially in rural areas. Agricultural custom in general are formed in the game with each other people,which has been recognized by the vast majority of the community,therefore, agricultural custom are often self-interested parties within the community. As far as institutional economists concered,the institution is extremely important, but the implementation of the institution will not be worse than no it. So through sorting out the thinking of Marx, Commons Marshall and other classics million agricultural custom , accessing to other literature, surveying and analying Game ,this paper on the role of the invisible hand of custom institutional principles explores the mechanism based on the evolution of agricultural custom million for the institution and its implementation mechanisms, The main contents and conclusions are as follows :First, the effective functioning of the market mechanism is relied not only on the invisible hand of the market,but also on the custom proto- institution .As another invisible hand, the custom proto- institution on people’s choice is extremely important. The custom proto- institution has been relative stability, the broad masses and the external compulsion, acquiescence, and plasticity. From Evolutionary Economics perspective, the evolutionary mechanism for custom proto- institution at least includes genetic mechanism (replication), variation mechanism (create novel mechanism) selection mechanism and applicability of learning mechanism (genetic mechanism (replication mechanism), mutations mechanism (originally generative me chanism) selection mechanism and adaptive learning mechanism). The relationship between culture and customs is complex, on the one hand, the custom proto-institution loads and maintains cultural million; the other hand, culture as a "spiritual" of custom proto- institution becomes change and continuity of the evolution of a "gene." "Cultural-meme" is key to understand the enculturation mechanisms and cultural diffusion .The evolution of custom proto- institution is on the meme of the mechanism through enculturation mechanisms and the cultural diffusion.Second, stored on Marx, Commons, Muller, Marshall and other classics theory of the origin of the custom of agricultural land ownership, agricultural circulation practices, agricultural land inheritance customs, and the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices sorting out some ideas, such as leasing system or the price of agricultural land, Marx’s theory of Custom proto- institution of agricultural practices we have today is of important guiding significance to study agricultural practices, at the same time, and also has inspected the Germanic custom, France and the traditional Chinese community who exist in the system.Third, custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices is the most basic unit of analysis of the agricultural institution, but also the most ancient, there the longest agricultural land, agricultural land to reflect its ownership rules, self-imposed contract, third parties and the rules of certain important aspects of the system, such as agricultural land, including agricultural land area of measurement practices, Property agricultural practices, the circulation of agricultural practices and so on. The agricultural custom proto- institution of traditional and modern societies have an important impact on agricultural land property rights institution. Different parts of our natural, geographical, cultural, ethnic and economic diversity and differences in level of development, led to the difference and diversity of agricultural custom proto- institution.Fourthly, the agricultural property custom proto- institution is extremely important in the the agricultural custom proto- institution arrangements. Rights or property rights is more close contact with customs .It is not only a source of property rights, but property itself is the result of custom continue to evolve, or property is institutionalized custom. Marx was also conducted in-depth study of property rights institution of a civil society before in his<Das Kapital>. thereby creating a Marxist. Engels on the theory of property rights practices. The Origin of Custom Property Right of Farmland can be a simple game model to show that The model shows that in the absence of a third party under the conditions of the design, our scarce land resources in the case of self-organizing into a mutually beneficial property custom proto-institution. Meanwhile, the empirical results of this model not only provides a certain level of support, but also help us to better understand the origin of the agricultural property custom proto- institution.Fifth, The implementation mechanisms for the agricultural custom proto- institution includes self-enforcing mechanism and the third-party involvement mechanisms. These factors about agricultural custom proto- institution on the implementation mechanism shoud been seen from multi-angle, multi-level analysis. So the writer establishs a comprehensive analytical framework to explore.Sixth, in the process of the countryside agriculture circulating,Because most farmland is circulated by generally all oral agreements and has not signed the written agreement to the both side,it is essential for farmland to circulate the effective implementation of the agreement to keep one’s word and believe in the other side by oneself. This text introduce, play chess model analyze farmland flow, turn over formation mechanism that Cheng believe in between peasant households repeatedly. It is that the market economy must use the foundation stone that the health operates to believe in, it is indispensable to believe in the operation of the leasing market of farmland, But on the market of agricultural land rent, it is difficult to observe and measure the belief. The research results of experiment economics is helpful for the settlement of this problom .The Introducing the research of experiment economics indicates that : In the course of leasing of farmland, different trust that leases between both sides is different,Difference of trust not only influence current period lease choice of agreement, will exert an influence to lease behavior and implementation to lease system in the future; Meanwhile, it relates to lease prices even to believe in, required rental of the lesser and the lessee’s trust are obvious relevant relations of defeat;It has positive roles that the high efficiency to the leasing market of farmland of higher trust is operated. and ,this text also analyzed the mechanism that can be implemented of the oral agreement oneself between peasant households from believing in the visual angle of (trust game) .Seventh, the implementation of the agricultural custom proto- institution needs the correlative people to maintain the smooth participation. The agricultural custom proto-institution has to be self-implementing because an important aspect is the correlative litigant who sees their reputation import,that is say the reputation of an effective mechanism is to promote the agricultural custom proto- institution implemented. KMLW’s law about repeated game states that While farmers in choosing to recognize each other agricultural custom farmers property rights (cooperation), the ire of other farmers do not recognize their own land custom property (NCCTs) risk, but if their choice uncooperative, it is revealed to the non-cooperation. The proceeds will lose access to long-term cooperation might (if the other side is the type of cooperation). If a sufficient number of repeat Game, future earnings will exceed short-term gains, Even if a household is in nature is not cooperated, but the game began. Each participating farmers want to establish a cooperative image, the other that it was like cooperation; Only towards the end of the game, farmers can participate in the reputation established by the exhaustion of their one-time cooperation will stop. Relevative game perspective, the main leasing of agricultural land is based on the trust relationship between blood relations and the limited area relationship, a game in the field not only affect their choice of strategy of the game proceeds Moreover, it will also affect his reputation, the reputation as a social capital will affect their game in the relevant jurisdictions’s strategic options Therefore villages Game effective embedded leasing of agricultural land to the community to exchange their survival hinges domain repeated games, and its basic trading area overlapping jurisdictions and community exchange information with complete signal transduction efficiency. Game makes the association strong correlation trading domain and domain double punishment mechanism for the exchange of community confidence, non-agricultural land leasing practices of the high cost of default (because of the discount factor greatly benefit from the current default) Nash equilibrium of this game will be (letting compliance), embedded in the social domain and the related exchange of evolutionary stable strategy game will be (co-cooperation) agricultural practices so as to achieve a virtuous circle of implementation million.Eighth, like other system’s implemented with cost and benefits, regardless of the system of self- the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices implemented or a third party involved in the implementation, we are able to analyze the cost and benefits of the system. For the main, the benefits and cost of implementing the system is the standard of comparison, in this paper, In particular, we emphasize psychological profit and mental cost to the impact of the implementation of the system.Ninth, the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices can be implemented to analyze from the perspective of punishment. From the main punishment, punishment is the main form of self-punishment and penalizes others. From the perspective of punishment for analysis Institutional mechanisms for the implementation of agricultural practices can be divided into self-punishment through the self-enforcement mechanisms and penalties through third parties implementation mechanism. The custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices has to be self-enforcing mechanism, there are two mechanisms at work : First, self-reinforcing mechanism. The second is a self-correcting mechanism, or as self-punishment mechanism. Coupled with the economic entities with opportunism, can make self-punishment mechanism is not completely self-assurance custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices, hence the involvement of a third party, and the implementation mechanism for the imposition of punitive on the implementation of the custom proto-institution of agricultural land practices is of great significance.更多还原