【作者】 邓建平；

【导师】 曾勇； 何佳；

【作者基本信息】 电子科技大学 ， 企业管理， 2007， 博士

【摘要】 通过证券市场发行股票改造国有企业不仅是我国而且是世界上很多国家常用的方式。国内外研究通常关注的是国有企业上市后治理结构对于经营行为和绩效的影响，并没有深入、系统地分析发行上市前政府改造国有企业的不同模式所造成的影响。我国大部分上市公司是由原国有企业改制形成。源于我国渐进式改革、地方政府竞争资源、证券发行制度安排和上市要求管制等特殊的制度背景，在国有企业改制上市的过程中，上市前政府(特别是地方政府)出于对改革成本、难度的考虑，采用不同的改制模式对国有企业进行改造。改制模式的不同体现了政府对政策性负担、非经营性资产、劣质资产和富余人员的不同处理方式，从而造成国有企业在上市前具有不同的“禀赋”，这必然影响到上市后公司治理结构的安排，进而影响公司的经营行为、特征和绩效。通过分析1997年底至2000年底285家国有企业首次公开发行的数据，本文研究表明改制模式与治理结构的形成密切相关，改制的不彻底是我国证券市场存在一些尖锐治理问题的根源性原因，同时也是造成我国国有企业公开发行效率低下的主要影响因素。本文的主要研究发现包括如下五个方面。第一，我国国有企业多数通过非完整改造模式改造国有企业。第二，改制模式深刻影响公司的治理结构，非完整改造公司中，股权更为集中，控股股东对公司的控制程度更高，同时，改制模式也对董事会特征的形成造成显著的影响。控制程度、董事会特征与公司经营绩效存在显著的相关关系，但是这种相关关系很大程度是源于改制模式的不同。第三，非完整改造公司的控股股东存在占用上市公司资金的现象，而完整改造公司的控股股东则不存在这种问题。非完整改造公司发生关联交易、关联并购重组的概率和程度都显著高于完整改造公司。虽然股权结构对资金占用、关联交易和关联并购重组产生显著的影响，但是这种影响很大程度也是源于改制模式的不同。第四，改制模式的不同显著地影响公司利益的分配，非完整改造公司的控股股东直接占用上市公司资金的程度较高，从而分配较低水平的股利，完整改造公司则相反。完整改造公司的控股股东持股比例与股利支付水平的相关关系强于非完整改造公司。第五，我国国有企业公开发行的效率不高。国有企业公开发行后产出显著增加，负债率显著下降，但盈利能力显著下降，成本和费用支出显著增加，员工人数显著上升，人均经营利润并没有得到显著提升。完整改造公司公开发行后产出的增长、盈利能力的变化和成本控制的变化要优于非完整改造公司。研究还发现严重的资金占用和关联交易问题及不合理的治理结构安排是造成非完整改造公司的盈利能力表现差于完整改造公司的主要影响因素。值得注意的是，资金占用是影响非完整改造公司盈利能力低下的最重要因素。本文的研究结论对于主管部门进一步规范企业改制上市过程中的资产重组和政府行为具有重要的指导和借鉴作用。更多还原

【Abstract】 Share issue privatization (SIP) is a way of restructuring state-owned enterprises (SOEs) widely practiced by many other countries as well as by China. Most literature focuses more on the effect of post-IPO governance structure on the operation and performance of SOEs, and pays less attention to the influence of government’s adoption of different pre-IPO restructuring modes over the post-IPO operation and performance of SOEs. Most listed companies in China evolved from SOEs after restructuring. Under special institution situations, such as China’s gradual reform, the competition among local governments, the arrangement of stock issuing regulation and the strict regulation, the governments, especially the local ones, adopt different restructuring modes to reorganize SOEs when taking the cost and the difficulties of the reform into consideration. Different restructuring modes indicate governments’ different ways of dealing with such issues as policy burden, non-profit making assets and surplus staff, and thus lead to different pre-IPO "endowments" of SOEs, which affects later the post-IPO arrangements of governance structures, and accordingly the operation behaviors and performances of the listed companies.Using a sample of 285 Chinese SOEs that went public between 1997 and 2000, the empirical study of this research finds that the restructuring mode is closely related to the formation of the governance structure, and the incomplete restructuring is the primary reason that causes many serious problems in Chinese stock market and a leading factor that results in the poor performance of Chinese SOEs. Followings are the main research findings.Firstly, most of Chinese SOEs went through incomplete restructuring.Secondly, the restructuring mode has a profound impact on the company’s governance structure, and of course, has a dramatic effect on the formation of the characteristics of the board of directors. In an incompletely restructured SOE, the degree of the centralization of the company shares is high, and the controlling shareholders have a higher control over the company. The degree of control and the characteristics of the board of directors correlate with the performance of the listed company, and the extent of the correlation mainly depends on which of the different restructuring modes is adopted.Thirdly, controlling shareholders’ fund embezzlement is common among SOEs that went through incomplete restructuring while it is not the case in completely restructured SOEs. There is a higher probability and degree of related-party transaction and M&A happening among incompletely restructured SOEs. Though the ownership structure strongly affects fund embezzlement, related-party transaction and M&A, this effect, in fact, has its roots in the restructuring mode.Fourthly, the difference in restructuring modes exerts great influence over the distribution of benefits. Controlling shareholders in SOEs that underwent an incomplete restructuring have a higher degree of fund embezzlement, and thus they tend to pay fewer dividends. The opposite is true with SOEs with a complete restructuring. The correlation between the controlling shareholders’ shareholds and the dividend payout level is much more apparent in SOEs with a complete restructuring than that of the SOEs underwent an incomplete restructuring.Fifthly, the inefficiency of public offering is common among China’s SOEs, which is in sharp contrast with the cases of other contries. After IPOs, most SOEs noticeably have an output increase and leverage decrease, but at the same time, have an increase in cost, expenditure, staff number and a decrease in profit making, thus make no obvious improvement in operation profit per-employee. The empirical results show that SOEs with a complete restructuring achieve a greater post-IPO output increase, a better performance and cost control, than SOEs with an incomplete restructuring. The empirical study also finds that serious related-party transaction, fund embezzlement and unreasonable arrangement of govermance structure are three determinant factors in worsening the post-IPO performance of SOEs with an incomplete restructuring. Furthermore, fund embezzlement is the most important factor of all.To summarize, this study has its practical significance in regulating the government behaviours and the SOEs’ assets reorganization during IPO.更多还原