【作者】 张国宏；

【导师】 黎志成；

【作者基本信息】 华中科技大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 管理层收购(Management Buy-out,MBO)作为一种制度创新,可以在产业结构调整、明晰企业产权、节约交易成本、降低企业委托代理成本等方面发挥重要的作用。本研究以产权理论、委托代理理论、公司治理理论、激励理论、人力资本理论、企业家理论等为研究基础,以博弈论为主要研究工具,对MBO 在国企产权改革、公司治理结构完善和经营者激励和约束方面进行了深入研究,通过理论分析、实践论证和模型分析,得出了适合中国国情的解决方案。首先,本研究对MBO 实现国有企业产权改革、公司治理结构完善和经营者激励与约束等方面的有效性进行了深入研究。通过对2004 年热点国企改革问题的探析,提出了在新形势和新背景下国企五个重要的新型产权和公司治理问题; 在对国外众多国家国企产权改革过程系统分析的基础上,总结出了四个关键成功因子,并以此为衡量MBO 实现国有企业产权改革有效性的重要指标。还从委托代理、人力资本专属性投资保护、企业家价值和经营者激励与约束机制四个方面分析了MBO 解决公司治理结构问题的有效性。整个分析过程既有理论基础的支持,又有大量MBO 经典案例实证的支持,可以看到,不论是从国外国企改革的关键成功因子的角度,还是从解决国企新型产权和公司治理问题的角度,或者是从公司治理的核心问题,MBO 的有效性都得到了充分的验证。接着,本研究以静态完全信息博弈和不完全信息博弈为研究工具,对MBO 中的激励和约束问题进行了系统研究。通过出售――收购博弈模型和审查――欺骗博弈模型的分析,本文得出:MBO 是一种有效的激励手段,将能够充分激发企业家的经营热情和经营天赋,从而在实现个人价值的同时,实现企业收益的提高,达到双赢的效果。同时,在MBO 实施过程中,有效的监管是必须的,而且要尽可能降低监管成本、必须强化和完善惩罚措施,否则,所谓的有效监管无异于隔靴搔痒,根本发挥不了应有的作用。而且,必须要对管理层实际所拥有的人力资本价值进行甄别,对经营决策的管理能力进行评估,从中确定那些真正具有企业家才能的管理层,这样才有利于物质资本与人力资本的重新优化。最后,本文分析了在当前MBO 在国企改革中的难点问题,既包括产权改革方面的问题,也包括完善公司治理结构方面的问题。为了能够提供有效的应对措施,本文对全世界各国国企改革的问题进行了系统的归纳,总结出了八点有益的借鉴经验,从更多还原

【Abstract】 As a mechanism innovation, Management Buy-out (MBO) would play a great role in adjusting industries structure, clarifying the property right of the enterprise, decreasing business cost and reducing the cost of the principal-agent in the state-owned enterprise. Based on the property right theory, principle-agency theory, corporate governance theory, incentive theory, human capital theory, and entrepreneur theory and with the game theory as the main research tool, this paper make a study about reforming state-owned enterprise property right, perfecting the corporate governance and building incentive and restraining mechanism for management during the MBO application. Firstly, we study the effectiveness of MBO in state-owned enterprise property right reform and corporate governance perfect. Through the analysis of the hotspot problems of the state-owned enterprise reform in 2004, we propose the five new problems in the property right and corporate governance. Through the systemic analysis of the state-owned enterprise property right reform in different countries, we summarize that there are four key success factors in the property right reform, which can be used as the measurement indexes to measure the effectiveness of the MBO in state-owned enterprise property right reform. Furthermore, we also analyze the effectiveness of the MBO in corporate governance perfect from different aspects including principle-agency, human capital, entrepreneur value and incentive and restraining mechanism of the management. In our analysis, which includes both theoretical analysis and practical analysis with typical cases of MBO application in China, we demonstrate that MBO is effective and efficient in the state-owned enterprise reform. Secondly, with the game theory as a main research tool, we make both static complete information and incomplete game analysis of the incentive effect of MBO and how to watch and control MBO trade with the analysis of the sell-buy game model and censor-deceive game model. We declare that MBO is an effective incentive mechanism which can completely inspire the management passion and management genius of the entrepreneur so that they can both realize their personal value and heighten the revenue of the country which is a win-win status. Simultaneously, during the application of MBO, it is necessary to make an effective examination with low cost and high punishment. Finally, we study the difficulties of the MBO during its application and implementation in China, which include both property right problem and corporate governance problem. To provide the solution, we make a systemic conclusion of state owned enterprise reform in the different countries and propose eight important references for the MBO solution. During the implementation of MBO, the loss of the state-owned assets is a key problem, in some extent, it has hindered the widely implementation of MBO in China. Firstly, this research proposes several measures to effectively protect the state-owned asset from being lost. We declare that although there exit different problems and difficulties in the application of MBO, it is an effective and efficient tool to solve the property right problem in the state-owned enterprise if we can find out a proper MBO model of China. Moreover, although the property right problem is the rootstock of the corporate governance problem in the state owned enterprise, after the property right, the perfect corporate governance must be built, which is the same with the MBO application. To successful apply the MBO in China state-owned enterprise reform, we must perfect the corporate governance after MBO implementation.更多还原