【作者】 何伟；

【导师】 辜胜阻；

【作者基本信息】 武汉大学 ， 政治经济学， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 风险投资是一种向极具发展潜力的新建企业或中小企业,尤其是高技术创业企业提供股权资本的投资行为。从实践中看,风险投资在促进高技术创业企业技术创新、进而带动高技术产业发展上发挥了重要作用。虽然在技术创新和风险投资这两大领域中,有关研究已相当深入,但有关风险投资与高技术创业企业技术创新之间关联的系统研究却相对较少。基于此,在借鉴已有理论成果的基础上,本文尝试着在此方面作些探索。具体讲,本文以高技术企业中的一类特殊类型企业——高技术创业企业为研究对象,从微观的企业融资和企业治理视角,并结合宏观的制度环境分析,对风险投资培育高技术创业企业技术创新能力和技术创新动力两个方面的作用机制,以及高技术创业企业技术创新模式进行理论研究和实证分析,最终构建一个分析上述两者之间关联的理论框架。在此基础上,分析我国风险投资作用机制的现状,进而提出完善我国风险投资作用机制,以促进技术创新的相关对策。 作为研究前提,本文第一章首先探讨了企业“技术创新”的内涵,并对“高技术创业企业”进行了界定。在借鉴有关研究成果基础上,将企业技术创新要素抽象为企业“技术创新动力”与“技术创新能力”两个有机联系的部分。然后,结合高技术创业企业特征,分析了高技术创业企业的技术创新特征:一方面,它具有较强的技术创新动力;另一方面,它的技术创新能力较弱,这也是现实中高技术创业企业往往具有很高失败率的一个重要原因。由此确立本文的研究思路:以风险投资培育高技术创业企业技术创新能力及其创新动力两个方面的微观作用机制为研究主线,结合宏观制度环境对这一作用机制的影响,构建一个风险投资作用背景下的高技术创业企业技术创新模式,从而为研究两者之间的关联提供一个理论分析框架。 在高技术创业企业的技术创新中,资金短缺及其面临的融资约束是一个非常突出的现象,也是高技术创业企业技术创新能力薄弱的重要体现。本文第二章从企业融资视角探讨风险投资培育创业企业技术创新能力的作用机制。作为逻辑基础,本文结合高技术创业企业及其技术创新资金需求的特征,分析了外部资金对高技术创业企业进行投资所面临的高风险特征,包括技术创新中客观存在的高风险以及由于严重的信息不对称所导致的逆向选择和道德风险,而创业者人力资本更多还原

【Abstract】 Venture Capital Investment(VCI)is a kind of equity investment in the potentially young firms or small and medium enterprises, especially in the high—technology enterprises (HTE) . Empirically, VCI has played a very important role in promoting HTE’s technological innovation and driving high-technology industrialization. Though the existing studies in the two fields of technological innovation and VCI are quite abundant, few of them prefer a relatively systematical analysis of the correlation between the above two sides. Based on the existing theories, this dissertation tries to make a research on it. Concretely speaking, centering on a specific type ofhigh-technology firms——HTE, this dissertation tries to theoretically and empiricallyanalyze VCI mechanism, which cultivates HTE’s technological innovation capacity and innovation impetus, and HTE’s technological innovation mode from the micro perspective of the enterprise’s finance and governance and macro institutional analysis, thus constructing a theoretical framework of the correlation between VCI and HTE’s technological innovation. Based on the above framework, it analyzes the present state of the VCI mechanism in our country and puts forth some measures to perfect it.As the premise of study, Chapter one firstly discusses the intension of technological innovation and the definition of HTE. Meanwhile, it abstracts the two essentials of technological innovation capacity and innovation impetus. Then, based on the features of HTE, it analyzes the HTE’s technological innovation characters that it has strong innovation impetus and weak innovation capacity, which is one of the important factors causing HTE’s bankruptcy. Therefore, the thought of this dissertation can be defined as providing a theoretical framework by constructing the VCI-backed technological innovation mode of HTE, which centers on VCI mechanism and the institutional environment’s influence on the mechanism.It is very obvious for HTE’s technological innovation confronted with the fund scarcity and financing morass, which reflects the weakness in its technological innovation capacity. Chapter two surveys the VCI mechanism in cultivating HTE’stechnological innovation capacity from the perspective of HTE’s finance. As the logic basis of study, considering the features of fund demand in the HTE’s technological innovation, it discusses the high risk undertaken by outside investors, including the objectively high risk in the HTE’s technological innovation and adverse selection and moral hazard arising from the serious information asymmetry. The high risk can also be enlarged because of the entrepreneur’s exclusive human capital. Therefore, it can be deduced that the complete VCI mechanism in cultivating HTE’s technological innovation capacity should own two aspect: one is the mechanism that VCI deals with information asymmetry and spurs innovation so as to control risk, the other is the VCI’s functions in cultivating HTE’s innovation capacity, which is important for VCI to gain high return corresponding with high risk undertaken by it. Only on the above basis, do VCI dare to invest in the early stage when the HTE’s fund demand is very urgent, and thus resulting in VCI’s cultivating innovation capacity of HTE.Based on the above analysis, this dissertation analyzes the feasibility of bank loan as one of possible financing channel for HTE. Through the analysis of bank’s information production capacity, relational lend and relational financing, it points out that bank loan, by and large, is limited to cultivating HTE’s innovation capacity because of asset safety. And by comparison, as the another possible financing channel, VCI has an advantage over bank loan in two aspects: On the one hand, VCI has the three mechanisms handling information asymmetry and spurring innovation, such as efficient information production mechanism, marketable relational financing mechanism and social risk diffusion mechanism. On the other hand, VCI has a series of functions in cultivating HTE’s innovation capacity from the aspects of value-added service, capital support, social net resource support and the support for continuous innovation.Because VCI contract has a very important role in spurring innovation, Chapter three, from the perspective of the enterprise’s governance, further explores the VCI mechanism in cultivating HTE’s technological innovation impetus through its original governance handling principal-agent problem. Firstly, this dissertation points out that VCI contract is an equilibrium of the game between the venture capitalist (as principal) and the entrepreneur (as agent), and as game rule, the contract decides theactions of both sides through influence on respective interest. Based on the above points, from two aspects of solution to adverse selection and moral hazard, it uses game theory to explore the arrangement of VCI contract and governance mechanism concerned. It’s clear that VCI contract is actually a kind of contingent governance mechanism different from traditional contract arrangement, which can realize risk diffusion and incentive compatibility between two sides, thus mitigating agent problem and hence spurring innovation.Considering that a suitably institutional environment is helpful to VCI and HTE’s start-up, interaction and development, institutional environment becomes a constraint to the above VCI mechanism. Firstly, according to the influential degree of various institutions on VCI mechanism, Chapter four analyzes relating institutional environments from three hierarchies: fundamentality institutions (including market institution, property rights institution and more level capital market) , momentous institutions (with reference to government’s support) and other institutions (with reference to culture and credit environments) .Then, based on the existing technological innovation mode, including technology-pushing mode, demand-pulling mode and chain-linked model, through the introduction of institutional environment, this dissertation puts forward a VCI-backed technological innovation mode of HTE— —knowledge-demand mode, and discusses the feature of this mode from the horizontal and vertical comparison. Up till now, this dissertation has given a theoretical framework about the correlation between VCI and HTE’s technological innovation. Under this framework, this dissertation finally compares VCI mechanism from theirs institutional environment and VCI operation mechanism in the United States and Japan, and draws some inspiration concerning fully utilizing VCI mechanism: There should exist a suitable institutional environment; As the institutional supplier, government is important in pushing the development of HTE and VCI, but with regard to government, the key is how to give play to its function; The operation of VCI should abide by its objective law.Chapter five turns to discuss enforcing the VCI mechanism in China. Though our HTE and VCI have made great progress since our country’s reform and openness to the world, some factors have still restricted the efficiency of VCI mechanism. Alongthe above framework, these factors manifests in the following: imperfect institutional environment, weak entrepreneurship capacity, venture capitalists’ scarcity, bad credit consciousness and unmarketable VCI operation mechanism. At last, this dissertation puts forward practical measures, including perfecting institutional environment, enforcing entrepreneurship education and personnel training, cultivating social credit environment and constructing marketable VCI operation mechanism.更多还原