【作者】 李平；

【导师】 曾德明；

【作者基本信息】 湖南大学 ， 企业管理， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 企业经营者尤其是CEO的薪酬问题越来越受到学术界和实业界的广泛关注。西方发达市场经济国家二十世纪九十年代实施的股票期权给CEO带来的巨额薪酬成为了机构投资者所关注的主要问题,学术界更是对公司管理人员的薪酬进行了大量理论和实证研究。确定合理的经营者薪酬制度成为了建立有效的公司治理的核心内容。中国上市公司经历十余年的发展,现代公司治理逐步建立和完善,但在公司治理机制尤其是上市公司CEO薪酬激励机制的制定过程中还存在诸多困惑:CEO薪酬激励的理论基础到底有哪些?CEO薪酬体系激励路径怎样?上市公司CEO薪酬体系的主要影响因素有哪些?如何根据企业的权变环境特征设计有效的CEO薪酬激励体系?因此,如何根据企业的权变环境特征设计CEO薪酬体系,不仅是现代企业理论所关注的核心问题,而且也成为当前我国深化国有企业改革、促进国有企业发展所面临的一项十分重要而紧迫的任务。 国内外研究CEO薪酬的文献大多以代理理论为基础,研究者试图证明业绩与薪酬的正相关关系。而事实上,业绩只是薪酬的影响因素之一。代理理论的观点很少在实证研究中被证实说明了代理理论不能对业绩与薪酬的关系做出完美的解释。本文综合运用经济学的制度激励理论和管理学的管理激励理论,从不同的角度分析了CEO薪酬激励问题,从而为进一步研究上市公司CEO薪酬激励提供了理论基础。本文在对上市公司CEO薪酬及其激励效应进行界定的基础上,分析了CEO薪酬激励的路径和薪酬体系及其激励效应的测度指标。 本文较为全面、系统地分析了公司治理、公司经营复杂度、经理人市场的异质性、CEO个人需求偏好、公司经营绩效等权变因素对上市公司CEO薪酬体系的影响。尤其是对这些权变影响因素的定量分析,在国内还是一个新的领域。本文根据我国上市公司的实际情况和本研究的需要,设定了上述CEO薪酬体系影响因素的测度指标。 . 本文采用数学推理的定量方法和企业绩效评价的定性方法相结合,构建了上市公司CEO薪酬体系的设计模型。具体包括:上市公司CEO薪酬体系设计的权变影响环境的结构模型、上市公司CEO薪酬体系设计的权变影响环境类型的判别模型、CEO薪酬体系激励效应的测度模型。上市公司CEO薪酬体系设计的权变影响环境的结构模型从一个全新的角度引入了遗传算法与分层聚类分析,去除含有噪声的权变影响因素特征向量中的冗余信息,降低特征向量的维数,以及从众多的权变影响因素特征向量中选出有用的特征向量,从而提高了数据分类处理更多还原

【Abstract】 The CEO compensation has come under more and more consideration in academia and industry. In the nineties of 20 century of the western market economy countries, the mint compensation caused by CEO stock option has been the main consideration problem of institutional investors especially investment funds. There are more and more theory and empirical research on CEO compensation. The construction of rational manager compensation system is a core content of efficient governance mechanism. Furthermore, there are more and more theory and empirical research on manager compensation in academia. By experiencing ten years’ development, the governance mechanism in China listed companies has becoming established and perfect gradually. But there is still much bewilderment in the constitution of the corporate governance mechanism especially the CEO incentive mechanism. For example, the theory base of CEO incentive, how about the route of CEO incentive system, which are the main influence factors in the design of CEO compensation system, how to design a efficient CEO incentive mechanism according to the insider and outsider correlation surroundings. Furthermore, it’s not only a core matter of modern enterprise theory, but also a very important and necessitous assignment in the state owned enterprise reform and development.In China and other countries, the research of CEO compensation mostly based on principal and agent theory attempt to demonstrate the correlation of performance and compensation. In fact, the performance and compensation are influence factors each other, but it’s only one, indeed its not the most important influence factors. In empirical studies, the point of view of agent theory can be rarely approved, which demonstrated that it does not perfectly explain the relationship between the performance and compensation. This paper uses management, economics and sociology theory synthetically and analyzes CEO compensation incentive from different aspects that afford well theory base in the research of CEO incentive in listed companies. Based on the strict define on CEO compensation and incentive effects, this paper analyzes CEO incentive paths, CEO compensation system and measures of incentive effects.From the aspects of corporate governance, corporate attribute, market standard, human capital attribute and firm performance, this paper analyze the influence effectssystematically which are still a new research demesne in China. According to the conditions of Chinese listed companies and the need of research, this paper design the measures of the influence factors of CEO compensation system.By integration econometrics and firm performance measures, this paper design the CEO compensation design model which includes CEO compensation system design correlation influence factors construction model, CEO compensation system design surrounding judge model, CEO compensation system incentive effects model. CEO compensation system design correlation influence factors construction model allusions relegate means and principal methodology and the selection of efficient factors from correlation influence factors. In this way, the analyze efficiency are improved. In the CEO compensation system design surrounding judge model, we use layer means to discriminate different correlation. We construct CEO compensation system judge function according to judge analyzing. In the CEO compensation system incentive effects model, we use improved principal means that completely include most of the information, by using comprehension principal measures that can measure the incentive effects efficiently. In this way, we design the CEO compensation system design principal and selection method.By empirical examination, this paper constructs CEO compensation system design correlation influencing factors surrounding model according to company type. Firstly, by an elementary layer analyzing on empirical samples and draw the theory conclusions, and measure the efficient numbers. Secondly, by using testament method on the empirical samples, we get the CEO compensation system design surrounding judge model. Based on this method, we get CEO compensation system design surrounding judge function. According to the sample of listed companies, we measure the incentive effects of CEO compensation and conclude the attribute of CEO compensation system the gets the high score. By this means, we get the best CEO compensation system. Lastly, we discuss the dynamical factors of CEO incentive system design and afford a dynamical CEO compensation design model in order to afford theory base and policy advice for Chinese listed companies.From an empirical examination, this paper find that the corporate governance factor which is defined as a most important influencing factor has become the major standard which is according to surrounding type. The corporate should begin with stock-right incentive. And improve CEO stock right and option encouragement system which form multiple compensation models. The second type should pay attention to CEO money compensation incentive system that will have non-stock multiplecompensation model. According to the optimizing on inside governance surrounding, they should transfer to multiple compensation models. The third type should emphasize CEO control right incentive and restriction system that will director the freaky system to money and stock incentive. The conclusions of this paper afford theory and empirical base for the improvement on annual compensation which is the basic CEO incentive model.更多还原