【作者】 陈天宝；

【导师】 许惠渊；

【作者基本信息】 中国农业大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 目前农村集体产权制度的缺陷,造成了一系列严重的问题。如何创新农村集体产权制度,从而建立“归属清晰、权责明确、保护严格、流转顺畅”的现代产权制度,是今后农村经济体制改革的重要课题。 本文首先从理论上剖析了农村集体产权以及集体产权制度的内涵。同时应用制度变迁理论中“需求—供给”分析以及博弈分析方法,对农村集体产权制度变迁进行研究。本文认为,回顾20世纪50年代的中国集体化,意识形态是其发生的根本原因,而建国之后国家对于工业化的强烈需求以及苏联发展模式的示范作用,推动了农村集体化的快速发展。而60年代初“三级所有、队为基础”的制度安排、以及70年代末80年代初的家庭联产承包责任制的建立都是国家和农民这两极行动集团在意识形态和政治结构的约束下,通过比较制度创新的“效益—成本”指数情况下的博弈均衡。在1984年完成家庭联产承包责任制改革之后,地方政府作为制度创新“第一行动集团”的地位得到强化,在制度创新中发挥了主导作用。地方政府在制度变革中具有突出的优势,也存在一些缺陷。通过对乡镇集体企业改制过程进行分析,本文提出:乡镇集体企业的制度变迁具有路径依赖特征,改制是企业“内部人控制”的延续和发展;经营者人力资本和制度变迁在企业发展过程中相互作用。 其次,本文在分析农村土地产权制度存在的主要问题和不同的改革思路、土地产权制度与经济绩效、土地产权制度与农民权益的关系,以及比较中国与俄罗斯土地制度变迁路径及其效果的基础上,确定农村土地产权制度创新的思路。即通过“土地确权”,强化农民对集体土地的“三项”权利,集体土地产权由“共同共有”向“按份共有”转变。 第三,本文对中央政府、地方政府、农民在征用土地过程的博弈分析表明:要实现粮食安全目标,保护农民的权益,必须进行制度创新。其思路主要是:实行严格的土地管理责任制度;对土地非农化过程中的直接收益进行调整,减少地方政府在土地非农化过程中获得高额直接收入;土地补偿以合理的价格为基准。在村委会与农民在分配征用土地补偿收益的博弈分析表明,必须改革土地补偿分配机制。通过对工商企业、村委会、村民三方在土地流转中的博弈分析表明,要实现帕累托最优,又使农民权益不至于受损的条件是:农民在土地流转中具有完全自主权,同时通过发育土地流转中介组织,创新农村合作组织,代替原来的行政性服务组织。 第四,在分析社区集体经济组织产权制度的进展、以及社区股份合作制现有的制度缺陷以及原因基础上,提出了制度创新对策:即分阶段逐步减少直到最终取消集体股、逐步使股东具有完备的产权、以及地方政府应及时提供制度供给。更多还原

【Abstract】 The defects of the rural collective property rights institution of China have brought a series of serious problems. It is an important topic that how to innovate the institution and set up the nowadays’ property rights institution of "property rights clear, rights and responsibility definitude, protection strict, and transferring smooth".Firstly, the author studied the origin and transformation of the rural property rights institution of China through using the analyses ways of "demand-supply" in the system transformation theory and game analysis. The time extent was more than 50 years for 1950’s. The author putted forward that the reasons of Chinese collectivize in 1950’s was ideology and the strong need of industrialization, and the demonstration of the Soviet’s development model, and the institutional arrangement of "three class own, and team is base" in 1960’s and the establishment of family contract institution in the end of 1970’s and early of 1980’s was the game equilibrium of the state and the farnls based the compare of "profit-cost" of institutional innovation, the game was based on the ideology and political structure. After 1984, regional governments have been one of the main bodies of Chinese rural reform, and paid main role in the institutional innovation. The analysis on the conducts of regional governments in the reform indicates that regional governments have a lot of advantages in the system reform, such as finding promptly the needs of system, collocating effectively resources and reducing the costs of system reform, but also have some disadvantages. The Township Collective Enterprises institution transformed gradually. The analysis of the game between regional government and managers in the institutional change shows: the enterprises institutional change has the character of path dependence, and institutional change is the sequel of "insider control", the human resource of managers and institutional change have interacted in the process of economic growth.Secondly, the author analyzed the main problems of rural land property rights, the different reform ideas, the relationship of land property rights with economic performance and farm’s rights and interests, the experiences of Russian land system change. And the author confirmed the idea of rural land property rights institution, which is the institutional innovation way of gradual, different, experimental, which was used in past twenty years, and make farmer’s land property rights clarity and strong.Thirdly, the game analysis of central government, regional government and farms in the process of rural land confiscation indicated: in order to assure the safety of food supply and protect the farm’s rights and interests, the institution must been innovated. And the measures should as following: carry out strict land management system; regulate the direct profit of land confiscation and reduce the profit of regional government, and give farms reasonable compensation. The game analysis of villagecommittee and farms in the process of allocating the land compensation indicated that the system of the land compensation allocation should be reformed. The author also analyzed the game among enterprises, village committee and farms, and get the result: in order to achieve Pareto optimization and protect farm’s rights and interests, the farms should have the total independent rights, and replaces the primary executive service organization with rural cooperative organization through developing the land transferring agency.Fourthly, based on the analysis of development of collective property rights of community, and the institutional defects and the reasons of the Stock and Cooperative Ownership of community, the author putted forward the measures of collective property rights of community: gradually reduce the collective stock and finally cancel it, let stockholder get the independent property rights and regional government should provide promptly the institutional supply.更多还原