【作者】 刘斌；

【导师】 刘思峰； 陈剑；

【作者基本信息】 南京航空航天大学 ， 管理科学与工程， 2005， 博士

【摘要】 本文选取具有需求不确定和单周期分阶段销售特点的短生命周期产品作为研究对象,按照由浅入深、逐级推进的思路,选取三种不同的市场运作环境,对供应链节点企业的决策行为进行了建模分析。以优化整体供应链系统为目标考察如何使买卖双方获得最大的期望利润,并以单供应商和单零售商组成的分散式决策系统为例,设计了适宜的契约来协调决策风险分配上的矛盾,使他们既从个体利益出发又制定符合系统整体利益之决策。具体地,解决了三个方面的问题: 1.供应链渠道协调的联合契约。针对完全竞争的市场,考察随机需求下单周期产品两阶段销售的渠道协调问题。应用随机动态规划模型刻画了不同销售阶段采用不同经销策略的运营模式,设计了具有双重激励和风险共担的联合契约来实现系统之协调,证明了供应链成员期望利润函数对决策矢量的凹性,给出了系统绩效最优的必要条件;研究表明:联合契约可以确保分散式系统的渠道协调,且具有协调利润可任意分割、协调实现仅依赖于系统的成本结构和反映风险市场公平分配规则等特点;同时,应用该机制有利于供应商巩固渠道地位和零售商绩效的稳定提高;进一步地,以风险厌恶零售商的激励问题为例探讨了应用联合契约实现系统绩效改善的问题。 2.价格依赖需求下的联合契约。摈弃了完全竞争市场的假设,研究了随机价格弹性需求下单周期产品两阶段销售的渠道协调问题。设计了售价商定的联合契约来实现渠道之协调,确保了独立个体订购与定价联合决策与系统联合决策目标的一致性。进而,归纳基本联合契约和售价商定的联合契约衍生出一种新的机制——利润共享契约,证明了其实现渠道协调的有效性。研究表明:售价商定的联合契约秉承了基本联合契约“有效性、灵活性、公平性和双赢”等优点;利润共享契约则更具一般性,适用于完全竞争和非完全竞争的市场环境。 3.TS 决策模式下的联合契约。针对完全竞争的市场,考察了融入信息更新情形下单周期产品两阶段销售的渠道协调问题。应用 Bayesian 更新技术将销售季节前市场需求的观测融入到零售商的补充订购和制造商的补充生产决策中,给出了供应链成员的订购/生产最优决策,比较了传统 QR 模式与 TS 模式在供应链成员订购/生产中的优势;进而,针对市场的需求不确定和产品的跌价风险,设计了有价格差异的联合契约来实现渠道系统之协调,并应用随机动态规划对其进行刻画,给出了系统完美协调的必要条件。研究表明:有价格差异的联合契约秉承了基本联合契约的优点,成功实现了分散决策下的整体优化目标,并可确保双方在合作中实现“双赢”。更多还原

【Abstract】 We address the challenge in dealing with the short-life-cycle product that is characterized by the uncertain demand and the single-cycle with several selling periods, and study the decision behaviors of agents on supply chain under three representative operation settings according to the thought of progressive extension. For each setting, the behavior of a risk-neutral centralized supply chain is optimized in the expected profit as a benchmark, then a feasible contract is designed for the decentralized supply chain system consisted of one supplier and one retailer, which can motivate the agents who maximize their own expected profit respectively to make the same decisions as the centralized system does. Concretely, our contributions are as following: 1. THE SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION WITH THE COMBINED CONTRACT. According to the perfect competitive market, we consider the channel coordination question under the uncertain demand and the marketing mode of single-cycle and two-period selling. We depict the operation mode, where retailers sell the products with different marketing policies in different selling periods, with the stochastic dynamic programming model, and the Combined Contract (CC), a stimulant and risk-compensation mechanism, which can ensure the channel coordination, is presented for the decentralized system. Then, we prove that the expected profit function of the agent is concave on decision variables, and derive the necessary condition to achieve the optimal performance for the whole system. It is shown that the CC can ensure the channel coordination, and is flexible enough to arbitrarily allocate the coordination profit of system between the agents on the supply chain. With the CC, the profit allocation follows the fair rule in risk-market----the higher risk, the more expected profit, which helps the decentralized system to reach win-win. At the same time, the CC can also help the supplier strengthen his status in channel, and improve the retailer performance steadily. Furthermore, with the Mean-Variance method we illustrate the performance improvement of system with the CC under the risk-averse retailer. 2. THE COMBINED CONTRACT UNDER THE DEMAND DEPENDED PRICE. Discarding the assumption of the perfect competitive market, we consider the channel coordination question under the uncertain and price-elasticity demand and the marketing mode of single-cycle and two-period selling. The Combined Contract with Pending Prices (CCPP) is developed to achieve the channel coordination, and we prove that it can ensure the consistency in the jointed decisions of ordering and pricing for the decentralized retailer and for the whole system. Furthermore, to sum up the characteristics of the CC and the CCPP, a new coordination mechanism, Profit-Sharing Contract (PSC), is designed and it is proved that the PSC can ensure the system coordination under the above setting. Furthermore, it is shown that the CCPP takes the highlights of the CC, such as validity, flexible, fair, and win-win for two agents so on, and that the PSC is generalize and suitable to be operated under the perfect and non-perfect competitive market. 3. THE COMBINED CONTRACT UNDER THE TS DECISION MODE. According to the perfect competitive market, we consider the channel coordination question under the information updating and the marketing mode of single-cycle and two-period selling. With the Bayesian updating techniques, we develop the Two-Stage (TS) decision mode, which synthesize the demand observation before selling season to the retailer’s second ordering decision and the supplier’s second yielding decision, and present the optimal decision methods of agents. Then we compare the superiority of TS mode in ordering/yielding decision with the traditional QR mode. Furthermore, to the risk in the uncertain demand and the dropping price in the second selling period, the Combined Contract with Different Wholesales (CCDW) is designed to achieve the system coordination, and we depict it with the stochastic dynamic programming model, and develop its necessary更多还原