辩证法视域中的善、美和目的论——从康德哲学引出的一种思考

【作者】 李欣；

【导师】 俞吾金；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 外国哲学， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 本文的真实关怀是在和幸福的对立中突显的道德;但这种对立却并不是形式逻辑意义上的矛盾,而是辩证法。造成形式逻辑上矛盾的对立双方必然互相排斥,造成辩证法的对立双方却能够兼容。幸福和道德的辩证对立表现在:两者分别是理性的两种完全不同的用途,前者是内指的用途,后者是超越的用途;同时它们却能够兼容在同一个理性之内。由于这种兼容性,也由于理性自身的限制,我们常常容易对理性的超越用途视而不见,于是幸福和道德就都被归于理性的内指用途了。这样一来就使我们难于认识道德的特性,由之而来的后果不言而喻是非常值得忧虑的。本文之所以要在辩证法的视域中讨论道德的善正是出于这种忧虑,因而试图通过这样的讨论恢复理性的超越用途,揭示道德的特性。在本文的前两章里,我花费了极大的精力完成这个讨论。我的思路也许有些迂曲,但这是出于问题本身的需要。我认为理性的两种用途虽然可以兼容,却毕竟需要保持各自的特性,因而不能互相逾界。我首先论述了在内指用途中的理性完全不能有超越的用途,否则必然形成虚假的知识,从而引发一种误用造成的辩证法。然后论述了在超越用途中的理性必须有超越的用途,否则必然形成荒谬的知识,从而引发又一种误用造成的辩证法。这样就使理性的两种用途保持在自己的界限之内,由此突出了幸福和道德之间的辩证法。由于理性的超越用途很容易被忽视,所以我给予了它较多的关注,同时也把它作为辩证法中一个极为重要的问题。我注意到在内指用途中的理性其实就是思辨理性,它也有超越使用的自然倾向。既然是自然倾向,这种使用必然会发生;但它又没有这样的特权,就使自己陷入困境之中。我在古希腊早期哲学和本体论思想中发现思辨理性的这种两难处境,于是利用第一章中的两个附论对之进行了详细剖析,从而完成对思辨理性超越使用的检讨。我也注意到在超越用途中的理性其实就是实践理性,它也同样面临一个困境:既然我们只有通过经验才能认识,我们如何认识这样一种超越经验界限的实践理性呢?这个困境不能解决,道德的超越特性也就无法保证了;这也将使辩证法问题遭受非难,因为没有了理性的超越用途辩证法也就无从谈起了。我在苏格拉底和柏拉图的哲学里发现了对此问题最早却又最值得关注的思考,于是利用第二章中的两个附论深入地辨析了问题的根源,从而使实践理性摆脱这个困境。经过这样的论述之后,我对辩证法也就形成一种全新的理解。幸福和道德的对立是辩证法的实质,理性的内指用途和超越用途的对立是辩证法的根据,思辨 I<WP=6>理性和实践理性的对立是辩证法的表现。这是理性中固有的辩证法,我称之为体上的辩证法。不同用途中的理性互相逾界地误用造成的辩证法,我称之为用上的辩证法。用上的辩证法因为发生的领域不同可以区分为实践理性的用上的辩证法和思辨理性的用上的辩证法;思辨理性的用上的辩证法又因思辨理性先验使用和超越使用的不同误用可以区分为认知的辩证法和推理的辩证法。另外,康德还讲到逻辑上的误用造成的辩证法,但那并非真正意义的辩证法,而且与哲学问题无关。由于幸福和道德的辩证法兼容在同一个理性之中,理性就有要求在自己之内对立的双方达到沟通的权利。我们立刻面对了这样的问题:既然辩证法限定了它们不能互相逾界,如何进行沟通呢?我按照康德的思路去寻找某种中介,也像康德那样把美和目的论作为这种中介。但它们两者作为中介去完成沟通的任务的方式却并不一样;在本文的后两章里,我分别讨论了美和目的论如何作为中介承担沟通幸福和道德的任务。美以这样的方式来完成沟通的任务:它作为两者之间的中介,能够使我们的理性自觉地从幸福向道德过渡。我认为美的这个作用非常重要,它在某种程度上可以解决道德教化的问题,即我们如何使自己在幸福和道德的对立中自觉靠近道德。通过对康德美学的分析,我发现美的实质是主体对经验的一种超越态度,这样的态度使我们从经验的束缚中解放出来从而获得一种愉悦感。人正是在这样的超越态度中,就与幸福保持了距离;而与幸福越远,也就离道德越近了。以超越的态度观照人生,就能够逐渐认识到什么是不须执著的无意义,什么又是必须执著的意义。对于幸福我们其实无须执著,而对于道德律令却必须执著。从而在与幸福的断然决裂中,心灵由美的境界得以上升,促成道德意识的挺立。我从康德的论述中发现康德正是以这种本质为核心论述美的,但他却把由反省判断力造成的艺术美混淆进来,使得他的论述晦涩难解。我以极大的努力将康德的混淆予以澄清,恢复了美作为过渡作用的真实意义;同时这种工作又使我不得不详细区分不同类别的美,我在这个区分过程中表述了自己在美学上的见解。目的论又以另外的方式来完成沟通的任务:它不再是从幸福向道德的过渡,而是既已完成超越的意志向经验世界的返身回顾。作为经验世界的全部自然在目的论上从属于这样一个终极目的,即作为道德主体的人;这是目的论最为关键之处。由此我们看到在美和目的论之间存在的差异性:前者是从经验到超越,后者则是从超越到经验。由于同在一个《判断力批判》之内,康德也把由?更多还原

【Abstract】 The purpose of this paper is to emphasize morality as the opposition of happiness,their relationship is not logic contradictory but dialectic. The two opposite sides mustexclude each other, but the two dialectic sides can be included each other. Thedialectical opposition between happiness and morality can be expressed in thefollowing: they belong to the two different uses of reason. The former refers to theimmanent use, and the later refers to the transcendent use. But they can exist in themutual reason at the same time. We often ignore the transcendent use of reasonbecause of the inclusion and the limitation of reason, so the happiness and moralityare attributed to the immanent use of reason. So, it is difficult for us to learn thespecificity of morals and the consequence is also concerned .The purpose of this paperis to restore the transcendent use of reason and reveal the specificity of morals fromthe dialectic view. I take great efforts to discuss this subject in the first two chapter .Inneed of remaining their own specificity, in my opinion, the two uses of reason can beincluded but can not be gone beyond. Firstly, I state that the reason in the immanentuse excludes completely the transcendent use, or it must form the false knowledge andlead to a wrong dialectic; Secondly, I state that the reason in the transcendent use mustinclude the transcendent use, or it must form absurd knowledge and lead to anotherwrong dialectic. So the two uses of reason keep their own limitation, and stress thedialectic between happiness and morals. Being ignored easily, I pay more attention to the transcendent use of reason, andregard it as an important subject of dialectic. I notice the reason of immanent use isactually the speculative reason which has the natural tendency of the transcendent use.The use of this natural tendency inevitably appears, but it hasn’t this privilege and fallinto the difficulty. I realize the difficulties of speculative reason from the early Greekphilosophy and ontology, so I specifically analyze it in the two postscripts of Chapter1 and finish to examine the transcendent use of the speculative reason .In fact, thereason of the transcendent use is the practical reason .It also face the difficulty. Howdo we know the practical reason which can transcend empirical limitation? We cannot ensure the transcendent specificity of it if the difficulty can not be dealt with .Thedialectic will be in trouble because of lacking of the transcendent use of reason, either.Socrates and Plato’s philosophy concerned this subject early. I deep analyze the originof this subject in the postscripts of Chapter 2 and make the practical reason free.<WP=8>The new comprehension of the dialectic comes into being after my statement. Theopposition of happiness and morality is the essence of dialectic; The opposition of theimmanent use and transcendent use of reason is the basis of dialectic; and theopposition of speculative reason and practical reason is the expression of dialectic. Sowe call it essential dialectic. Meanwhile, the dialectic which caused by mutual goingbeyond the limits of reasons of different uses, is called misused dialectic. In thedifferent fields, misused dialectic can be different misused dialectic of practical reasonfrom misused dialectic of speculative reason . The different misuses cause cognitivedialectic and reasoning dialectic. In addition, Kant mentions a kind of dialectic whichis caused by the logical misuse. But it is not the true dialectic and has nothing to dowith philosophy. The dialectic of happiness and morality are included in the mutual reason, so thereason can require to link up the two opposite sides. But how does it link up? I lookfor the medium according to Kant’s train of thought, as Kant regards beauty andteleology as the medium. As medium they have the different way to finish the linkingtask. In the last two chapters, I discuss respectively how beauty and teleology link uphappiness and morality更多还原