论独立董事与公司治理结构——国际经验与中国实践的研究

【作者】 谢联胜；

【导师】 黄亚钧；

【作者基本信息】 复旦大学 ， 世界经济， 2004， 博士

【摘要】 公司治理的核心目标是解决上市公司所存在的委托代理问题，即上市公司经理层和股东之间的目标函数不一致所产生的矛盾。中国上市公司普遍存在的内部人控制和大股东侵权问题彰显了公司治理的迫切性。 在这一背景下，近年来，中国证券市场开始大力推广独立董事制度。董事会是公司治理的关键平台，在法律上和在逻辑上，上市公司治理链条中可以清晰地看到“股东大会—董事会—经理层”这一层层选举、层层授权的序列。独立董事加入这个序列，其主要价值就在于对经理层等内部人进行制衡监督，强化董事会的独立和效率。 本论文以研究独立董事在公司治理中的功能为起点，重点探索了为什么中国在仿效美国等成熟证券市场推出独立董事制度后，该制度并没有预想中高效。全文共分九章，约17万字，大致归为三部分，第一部分为开篇的导论和最后的结语；第二部分探讨独立董事制度在公司治理中所承担的效用，包括第二章至第六章；第三部分分析中国上市公司独立董事制度的低效现象、成因和对策，包括第七章至第九章。在剖析中国独立董事制度的低效率根源时，主要运用了博弈理论中的因徒困境模型、信号理论和信息不对称以及董事会内生性模型。在给出对策方面，从制衡基础、董事会结构、独立董事准入机制、权责体系、激励制度和推选任免制度等方面提出了系统化的政策建议。更多还原

【Abstract】 The main target for corporate governance is to solve the agency problem in listed companies, i. e. conflicts between the management and shareholders arising from different goals. Insider control and big shareholders’ infringement of rights, which are problems ubiquitous in listed companies, indicate the imminence of corporate governance.Under these circumstances, the independent director system has been vigorously promoted in the security market in China in recent years. Board of directors is a core platform for corporate governance. Shareholder meeting - board of directors - the management, this sequence of voting and authorization hierarchy is clearly observable in the chain of corporate governance for listed companies from both legal and logical perspectives. The main value of independent directors becoming part of this sequence is to balance and monitor insiders including the management, and strengthen the independency and improve the efficiency of the board.Starting from a study in the functions of the independent director system in corporate governance, my thesis emphasizes a exploration in why, after following practices of US and other maturity markets, independent director system has unexpected low efficiency in China. The thesis has 9 chapters, 170, 000 words, and can be divided into three parts. The first part is the guiding discussion and final conclusions. The second part, from chapter 2 to 6, explores the role of independent director system in corporate governance. The third part, from chapter 7 to 9, analyzes the phenomenon, causes and countermeasures of low efficiency of independent director system of listed companies in China. Prisoner’s dilemma model, signal theory and information asymmetry theory from the Game Theory, and board indogeneous model are used to analyze the causes for low efficiency. For countermeasures,systematic policy suggestions are brought forward from perspectives of the basis for balances, board structure, independent director admittance mechanism, duty and responsibility system of independent directors, incentive mechanism for independent directors, and appointment and removal mechanism, etc.更多还原