会计政策选择研究

【作者】 王运传；

【导师】 吴水澎；

【作者基本信息】 厦门大学 ， 管理学， 2003， 博士

【副题名】从契约理论到利益相关者理论

【摘要】 本文是一篇规范性论文，借鉴实证研究成果，运用经济学和管理学基本原理，从契约理论、利益相关者理论与会计的关系入手，考察两种理论下的会计政策选择。笔者认为，契约理论下的会计政策选择之所以具有机会主义特征与契约理论自身的缺陷有关，同时会计政策选择内外约束机制的失衡及其会计质量水准不高也是重要的因素。而利益相关者理论下的会计政策选择，在内外约束机制下，注重提高会计质量水平，可以有效克服这一缺陷，体现出利益相关者的价值最大化。会计政策选择既是会计学科中的重要理论问题，又具有很强的实务性。全文立足于实务问题的解决，以利益相关者理论为基础，坚持会计政策选择的原则，推导出会计政策选择的理论框架。 本文的主要内容和观点如下： 会计政策选择是一种决策，其主要目的在于以一定的方式影响会计系统产出的信息。会计政策有广义和狭义之分，也有宏观和微观的区别。外部环境，特别是经济环境，是影响会计政策选择的主要因素，千差万别的企业主体自身更是会计政策选择的重要因素。会计政策选择的原因有客观和主观两个方面。会计对象的不确定性、计量属性的多样性、会计实务的多样性和涉及利益的复杂性、会计准则发展与会计实践发展的不同步性、信息不对称性、会计准则的公共契约性等是其客观原因；利益动机则是其主观原因。会计政策选择具有经济后果特征，影响着利益相关者利益的分配，所以是各方关注的焦点。会计政策选择的目标是在服务于会计目标的前提下，达到利益相关者的价值最大化。 国外有关会计政策选择的实证研究可以分为三类：契约动机、资产计价动机、影响利益相关者的动机。契约动机的会计政策选择研究一般包括报酬契约和债务契约。会计政策选择被认为能够影响企业的一个或者多个契约。许多契约协议的安排是为了减少内部和外部的代理冲突，而会计政策选择作为处理代理人之间利益冲突的一种手段，能够更好地趋同各方动机，减少代理成本，促使公司价值最大化。许多实证研究考察了这些契约是否使得管理当局有动机在众多的会计方法中进行选择以达到预期的财务报告目标，结果表明：管理当局会通过会计政策选择，增加自身报酬或者减少违反债务契约的可能性。会计政策选择，受信息不对称所驱动，企图影响股票价格。但总的说来，影响价格的机制还没有被很好的阐述。对会计政策选择是否具有经济后果的检验表明，会计政策强制性变更有经济后果，而会计政策自发性变更无经济后果。会计政策选择影响外部使用者—第三方利益相关者，如税收机构、政府管制者等。管理当局希望通过影响会计数据来影响这些第三方利益相关者的决策。最通常的假设是，公司选择会计政策以减少或延迟纳税以及避免潜在管制，最终降低政治成本。而国内有关会计政策选择的研究以规范研究为主，实证研究为辅。规范研究涉及会计政策选择概念的界定、选择的原因、影响选择的因素、选择原则、选择目标等，并有研究者利用经济学原理论证了会计政策选择权是有效的合约安排等命题。实证研究涉及到会计政策选择下的盈余管理研究、三大假设检验、会计政策选择的后果研究等。虽然研究结论与西方有所差异，但这些研究成果加深了人们对会计政策选择的认识，对日益丰富的国内会计政策选择文献做出了贡献。 新古典经济学主要从技术角度出发，认为企业就是一个生产函数，通过“科斯革命”，企业由一个生产函数演变成一组契约关系，企业内部的利益关系才被关注。契约理论进一步发展演变为代理理论、团队理论等分支。契约理论与会计的关系使得会计在契约中的作用越来越重要，会计表现出鲜明的契约特征。经理人员的报酬、债务契约的签订和执行、经理人员的职位变迁、资本市场上的公司表现、企业的政治成本都与会计指标相联系，会计政策选择深陷其间变得复杂和敏感，机会主义者常常把会计政策选择作为手中的工具挥舞，以达到自利的目标。经理市场与会计的关系，使得代理人更加关注会计政策选择。经理人员通过会计政策选择可以有效的进行盈余管理，以便在经理人员之间的竞争中处于优势。上市公司的首次发行 (IPO)、股票定价、配股和特别处理(ST)等事件都体现出会计政策选择的特别作用。资本市场与会计政策选择的关系，使得会计政策选择的研究领域更加广阔。税收、收费等管制，对于企业来说是一种政治活动，利用会计政策选择可以有效地减少企业的政治敏感性，降低政治成本。契约理论过度关注企业内部股东的利益。事实上，企业赖以生存的利益相关者不仅仅包括经理人员和股东，债权人、员工、供应商、消费者、政府等，也与企业的利益紧密相关;显然，科斯企业理论及其以后的发展，对企业的认识存在着一定的局限性，“公司是由持有该公司普通股的个人和机构拥有”的传统观点过于狭隘。笔者认为，会计政策选择成为机会主义者手中的工具，与契约理论有根本性的关系。股东利益至上观没有涉及经理人员、员工等其他利益相关者的利益，理性的“经济人”，当然会有利用会计政策选择来谋求自身利益的最大化;另外，会计更多还原

【Abstract】 Referring to the result of empirical analysis, the dissertation uses the fundamental principle of the economics and management to study the accounting policy choice from the relationship between accounting and the contract theory, the stakeholder theory, respectively. The dissertation accounts for that the basic reason that the accounting policy choice characterized of opportunism is the native defect of the contractual theory. Another important factor is that the inside and outside mechanism of restriction of accounting policy choice is out of balance. Accounting policy choice according to the stakeholder theory can validate to prevent this basic defective and maximize the interest of stakeholder under inside and outside mechanism of restriction. The accounting policy choice is an important part of the accounting theory and is important in practice. This dissertation is based on the settlement of practical problem, deducing the framework of accounting policy choice under theoretic guidance, in order to settle the accounting policy choice problem in practical use.Principal views of the dissertation are as follows:An accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either in form or substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, including not only financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory filings. This kind of decision-making can be a long-term policy application from strategy aspect and also can be a kind of maneuver to decide the output of accounting information that can attain certain purpose from the short-term tactics aspect. There are broad sense accounting policy and narrow sense accounting policy, macro accounting policy and micro accounting policy as well. The factor that impacts the accounting policy choice primarily is the exterior environment, especially the economic environment. Of course, the different business itself is also an important factor. The reasons for accounting policy choice include objective and subjective aspect. The objective reasons are as follows: the uncertainty and the variety of measurement of the accounting object, the variety of accounting practice, the complexity of involved interest, the development of accounting standard being not synchronizing with the development of accounting practice, information asymmetry, and the public contractual characteristics ofaccounting standard, etc. The subjective reason is the interest motive. The accounting policy choice is the focus that each party pays attention to because it has economic consequences of accounting choice, and influences the interest distribution of stakeholders. The object of accounting policy choice is to maximize the interest of the stakeholders in the premise of the accounting object.Therefore, we specify three categories of goals or motivations for accounting choice: contracting, asset pricing, and influencing external parties. The first category of market imperfections stems from the presence of agency costs and the absence of complete markets (otherwise, one could solve the agency problem through state-contingent contracts). Accounting choice is determined to influence one or more of the firm’s contractual arrangements. Such contractual arrangements include executive compensation agreements and debt covenants, the primary function of which is to alleviate agency costs by better aligning the incentives of the parties. However, depending on the structure of these contracts, ex post accounting choices may be made to increase compensation or to avoid covenant violation. In most situations, multiple accounting choices can be chosen singly or jointly to accomplish one or more goals. The second category of accounting choice, driven by information asymmetry, attempts to influence asset prices. The primary focus in this category is to overcome problems that arise when markets do not perfectly aggregate individually held information. Accounting choice may provide a mechanism by which better informed insiders can imp更多还原