【作者】 钟德强； 仲伟俊；

【Author】 ZHONG De-qiang,ZHONG Wei-jun(School of Economics & Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096; Management Science & Engineering Institute, Zhuzhou Institute of Technology, Zhuzhou 412008)

【机构】 东南大学经济管理学院；

【摘要】 从合约可观察性角度,利用合约理论与博弈理论,比较分析了两种不同供应链结构在可观察性合约与不可观察性合约下的Cournot竞争均衡结果.研究结果是:对于双寡头纵向供应链结构,在Cournot竞争条件下,若供应商提供给零售商的合约不能为其竞争对手所观察到,则相对于可观察合约而言,(1)批发价更高;(2)最终产品价格更高;(3)供应商利润更高;(4)零售商利润更低.对于寡占双产品分散式供应链,不可观察合约情形下,寡占供应商的利润小于可观察合约情形下的利润.得出的结论是:在双寡头纵向供应链结构中,供应商具有对其零售商提供保密合约的动力,但零售商具有获悉其竞争对手的进价的动力;在寡占双产品分散式供应链结构中,寡占双产品供应商具有承诺对其零售商提供相同的可观察合约的激励动力.更多还原

【Abstract】 From the viewpoint of contract observability, contract and game theories have been applied to analyze the Cournot market equilibrium outcome in supply chains with these two alternative structures. We find that :in case of two duopolistic vertical chains, compared to observable contract, secret contracts have following characteristics: (1)higher wholesale price, (2)higher market price, (3)higher profit to suppliers, (4) lower profit to retailers, and in case of the distributed chains with monopolist supplier, under secret contracts the monopolist supplier have lower profit than those under observable contracts. The conclusion is that, in case of the two duopolistic vertical chains,the suppliers have incentive to offer a secret contract to its retailer, but retailers have incentive to know their competitors’ purchase price, while in case of distributed chains with monopolist supplier, the supplier has incentive to offer a observable contract to its retailers.更多还原