【摘要】 文章通过改进后的信息经济学中多项任务委托-代理模型来对供应商的产品质量控制进行分析,得到供应商努力结果可观测下的最优激励方案。同时运用该模型来解释为什么多数供应商总是致力于质量目标的达成而非质量的持续改进,并提出了解决这一问题的方法。文中还建议采购商开展质量监理活动以消除信息不对称,并设计了一个可以促使质量监理工程师汇报真实的质量信息的激励机制。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyses quality control of suppliers’ products by amending multi-task principal-agent model of information economics, and finds the best incentive scheme on condition that the outcomes of suppliers’ efforts can be observed. At the same time, this paper explains why so many suppliers commit themselves not to improving the quality continually but to achieving the quality aim, and then it puts forward some approaches to this problem. This paper also suggests buyers should carry out quality surveillance activities, and designs an incentive mechanism which can induce quality surveillance engineers to report the true quality information.更多还原