节点文献

具身认知的两种进路

Two Programs of Embodied Cognition

  • 推荐 CAJ下载
  • PDF下载
  • 不支持迅雷等下载工具,请取消加速工具后下载。

【作者】 何静;

【Author】 HE Jing

【机构】 浙江大学语言与认知研究国家创新基地 浙江杭州310028;

【摘要】 具身认知观发展出一些新的概念和研究方法。其中有些补充和修正了传统的认知观念,而另一些则对传统的认知观念及其研究方法提出了挑战。具身认知观是否与传统的认知观相容,这取决于新概念和方法与旧概念和方法的区别程度,以及在什么情况下具身性能在新方案中获得成功。本文区分了具身认知观的两种不同进路:一种是温和的具身认知观,它与传统的表征计算基本假设相容;另一种是激进的具身认知观,它挑战表征计算的基本假设,认为心智的表征计算观是错误的。本文比较了这两种不同的进路,提出了我们的评价和观点。

【Abstract】 The embodied cognitive science developed some new concepts, some of which just amend the traditional tools, but others may stand in against to the traditional view of internally computed instruction for action. Whether embodiment is compatible to traditional cognition depends on how radical they are, and on what place they will win. This paper distinguishes the two programs of embodied cognition: one is weak embodied cognition, which is compatible with traditional computational representational hypothesis; the other is the radical embodied cognition, which challenges computational representational hypothesis, and thinks it is false. This paper compares two programs of embodied cognition, and gives our own standpoints and opinions.

【关键词】 具身的; 认知观; 表征的; 计算的; DST;
  • 【文献出处】 自然辩证法通讯 ,Journal of Dialectics of Nature , 编辑部邮箱 ,2007年03期
  • 【分类号】B842.1
  • 【被引频次】43
  • 【下载频次】2178
节点文献中: 

本文链接的文献网络图示:

本文的引文网络