【摘要】 通过经典的委托代理理论的应用,论文分析了存在于技术所有者的逆向选择条件下的技术许可的价格契约设计的内在机理。研究表明,相对于对称信息条件下纯固定费用价格契约,逆向选择条件下将存在一类序列均衡分离契约,在这一分离均衡契约中,好的类型技术所有者,将通过具有信号传递作用的可变费用契约和差的类型技术所有者进行区分,同时,为了有效许可其高质量的技术,好的类型技术所有者还将通过相对应的固定费用或可变费用对技术使用者进行一定信息租的转移。更多还原

【Abstract】 Through the application of the classical principal-agent theory,this paper analyse the internal design mechanism of the price contracts of technology licensing under the conditions of adverse selectio based on the technology licensor.This paper show that there is a sequential separated equilibria contracts under the conditions of adverse selection compared with the pure fixed fee contracts of symmetric information.Within the sequential separated equilibria contracts,the good type licensor can differentiate from the bad type licensor through signaling a royalty to the licensee.At the same time,the good type licensor also give some information rent to the licensee through the way of the fixed fee or royalty.更多还原