【摘要】 针对异质产品Cournot寡头竞争市场,分析两家技术创新者将可替代的成本降低创新专利技术许可给有低劣技术在位企业时的许可策略问题.证明在固定费技术许可方式下,新技术拥有企业将总选择许可其非激变创新技术,最优技术许可数随低劣技术在位企业数与产品差异性程度的增大而增大,特别是当市场中低劣生产技术在位企业不少于5家时,每位新技术拥有企业都将选择多家许可;而且技术许可竞争将导致技术拥有企业尽可能多的许可激变创新技术,但新技术拥有企业存在合谋阻止或减少技术许可的激励动力.更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper analyzes the licensing strategies of patent-holding firms with cost-reducing innovation protected by a patent proprietary in a differentiated Cournot oligopoly market where two of firms has cost-reducing substitute innovation protected by a patent proprietary.It shows that,under fixed-fee licensing,both patent-holding firms is always willing to license its non-drastic innovation to the incumbent inferior firms,and the number of licenses by each patent-holding firm increases with the number of inferior firms and the degree of product differentiation,in particular,the number of licenses by each patent-holding is two or more two when the number of the incumbent inferior firms is not less than 5.Furthermore,it is found that the patent-holding firms willing to licensing its drastic innovation to more incumbent inferior firms,but the substitute patent-holding firms have incentives to collude in order to reduce or stop licensing.更多还原