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地区间人才流动政策的博弈分析
A Game-Based Analysis on Inter-regional Policy of Talent Flow
【摘要】 运用静态博弈理论分析地区间人才流动政策的决策问题。通过对不同地区、不同行业间的人才流动行为分析,建立了以生产力最大化为决策目标的地区间人才流动政策博弈模型,证明了人才流动博弈纳什均衡的存在性和惟一性。结果表明:在给定资本投资的条件下,地区间人才流动性越高,投资于教育的人口比例会越高,从而提高每个地区的生产力。但是,除一种特殊情况(人才流动政策均具有正的净效应)外,地区间人才流动政策的非合作博弈不能实现最优的帕累托效率。
【Abstract】 The problem of making inter-regional talent policy is studied within the theoretical framework of static games.By analyzing the inter-regional talent flows with industrial differences of productivity,this paper,based on the objective of regional productivity maximization,builds a game model on making inter-regional talent policy and proves that there is one and only one Nash equilibrium of policy-making game.The results show that given capital stock,the higher the inter-regional mobility,the higher percentage of the population who make their investments in education,whereby the productivity of each(regional) economy would be improved.However,the Pareto efficiency can not be realized through a non-cooperative game of inter-regional talent policy-making,unless the talent policy of each economy have positive net effect on the accumulation of human capital via education.
- 【文献出处】 系统管理学报 ,Journal of Systems & Management , 编辑部邮箱 ,2007年04期
- 【分类号】C96
- 【被引频次】10
- 【下载频次】714