【摘要】 运用博弈论中的“委托—代理理论”对代建制中存在的政府与代建单位之间的委托代理关系进行分析。根据不同的假设,分析了对称信息和非对称信息两种情况下的最优契约。在此基础上,对政府签订契约后的代理成本进行了分析。最后为代建制双方委托代理契约关系的进一步完善提供对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 The principal-agent relationship between the government and construction agency is analyzed based on the principal-a- gent theory in game theory.According to different hypothesis,the optimal contracts under both the conditions of symmetric infor- mation and asymmetric information are made.On the basis of this,the agent cost after the contract being signed by the govern- ment is then analyzed as well.The analysis shows that the agent cost is mainly influenced by the factors such as risk avoidable degree;output variance and cost coefficient of the construction agency.Finally,some proposals on further improvement of the contract relationship between the government and construction agency for a contract are put forward.更多还原