【摘要】 本文在非对称性冲击的假定下,研究了货币政策协调的斯塔克尔伯格博弈。对模型的斯塔克尔伯格均衡解的分析表明,非对称冲击对货币政策协调的政策效果有着不确定影响。在货币政策协调领域,由于冲击性质的改变,斯塔克尔伯格博弈中领导者的“先发优势”和“先动策略”并不能保证其从货币政策协调中获取确定的政策收益。更多还原

【Abstract】 In this paper,we analyzed the monetary policy coordination by a Stackelberg model under the hypothesis of asymmetric shocks.The analysis of the Stackelberg equilibrium solutions to the model shows that the asymmetric shocks have uncertain effect on the policy result of monetary policy coordination.In the area of monetary policy coordination,the preemptive superiority and strategy of the leader in the Stackelberg game cannot ensure him get certain policy gains from the monetary policy coordination.更多还原