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管理主义与宪政主义:理论与利益的复合博弈

Managerialism and Constitutionalism:Complex Game between Theory and Interest

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【作者】 刘伟红钱美华

【Author】 LIU Wei-hong1,QIAN Mei-hua2(1.Social School of Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China; 2.Politics and Public Management School,Soochow University Suzhou Jiangsu 215025,China)

【机构】 上海大学社会学院苏州大学政治与公共管理学院 上海200444江苏苏州215021

【摘要】 作为美国公共行政学的两大主体流派,管理主义和宪政主义的博弈自美国建国之初就已初现端倪。威尔逊的研究使公共行政学作为一门学科得以确立,他所确立的“公法执行”的学科定位同时奠定了管理主义作为公共行政理论发展主流的学科地位。而宪政主义正是不满于公共行政的执行地位以及公民资格的弱化而与管理主义的公共行政观展开了复杂的博弈,管理主义和宪政主义博弈的背后不仅仅是“效率”与“公正”的对立,还深刻演绎着理论阵营发展与现实利益发展的矛盾。

【Abstract】 As the main two school of public administration,managerialism and constitutionalism have taken up their game since the beginning of the U.S..The public administration forming as an independent discipline was attributed to Wilson’s studies.His discipline position of the public administration established managerialism as the mainstream station of the development of the public administration theory.Managerialism and constitutionalism took up their complicated game as constitutionalism was not satisfied with the carrying position of public administration and weakening of citizenship.The game is not only the embodiment of the opposition of justice and efficiency,but also the deduction of contradiction of between theory school development and realistic interests development.

  • 【文献出处】 江南社会学院学报 ,Journal of Jiangnan Social University , 编辑部邮箱 ,2007年02期
  • 【分类号】C931
  • 【被引频次】2
  • 【下载频次】792
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