【摘要】 我国国有企业普遍效益“不佳”是值得置疑的.博弈分析发现:对国有企业的财务监督不足和现有的经营者选拔考核机制所存在的问题决定了国有企业不一定会如实上报自己的盈利状况;而在相同条件下,变动收入的经营者比固定收入的经营者作假的可能性更大.国企经营者隐瞒利润的根本动机是为了维护自身的地位,要解决国有企业说假话的问题必须同时从加强审计和改善选拔考核机制上入手.更多还原

【Abstract】 It is worth doubting that "low" benefit generally exists in China’s state-owned enterprises.Game-analysis shows that failing supervision and problems of the exiting manager-selecting and appraisal mechanisms result in a state-owned enterprise not always reports its return according to facts,and managers with fluctuant income are more likely to lie than those with fixed income,under the same conditions.To safeguard position is the fundamental motive for SOE managers to conceal profit.Both reinforcing audit and improving selecting mechanism have to be carried out,in order to stop state-owned enterprise’s flam.更多还原