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寻租与腐败的经济学分析

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【作者】 周伟贤

【机构】 江西财经大学 江西南昌330013

【摘要】 转轨时期,在市场机会大幅增加而制度约束处于不完备的状态下出现了权力资本化现象,导致受权力租金诱惑的政府官员产生出租权力以获得私利的动机与行为,从而形成寻租与腐败蔓延的现象。因此强化权力监督、实行“以薪养廉”,并逐步使政府退出市场就成为抑制寻租与腐败的根本对策。

【Abstract】 During the transformation period, the fact that power is prone to be capitalized is partially connected to the increasing market opportunities and inadequate and less powerful regulation. That means bureaucrats seeking for the private profit by renting the power to one who can provide bribe. Consequently, the effective solution to the rent-seeking and corruption is a stricter regulation of power abuse and a high pay for the bureaucrats, as well as making the government to withdraw from the market.

  • 【文献出处】 特区经济 ,Special Zone Economy , 编辑部邮箱 ,2006年12期
  • 【分类号】F062.6
  • 【被引频次】16
  • 【下载频次】1480
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