【摘要】 由于制度缺陷和信息不对称性的客观存在,在税收管理中容易产生“设租”与“寻租”行为。税收寻租涉及立法、执法和司法三大领域,给经济发展带来严重危害。本文运用新制度经济学原理,提出使税收寻租者“不愿为、不能为、不敢为、不必为”的相应对策。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper argues that“ rent-seeking” and “rent-creating” behaviors can easily arise in tax administration because of institutional defection and asymmetric information. The existence of rent-seeking behavior in tax administration can seriously harm economic development for it brings about issues in tax legislation, law enforcement and judicature. Based on new institutional economics, the paper proposes relevant countermeasures to relieve rent-seeking behaviors by making rent-seekers “will not, can not, need not, and dare not” seek rent in tax administration.更多还原