【摘要】 运用定量分析的方法构造了博弈数学模型,讨论了寻租存在与否两种情况下,放松管制所导致的社会福利变化.结果表明,在不存在寻租的情况下,政府放松管制将促使社会福利增加;在存在寻租的情况下,政府放松管制对社会福利的影响和在位企业与潜在进入企业的相对数目相关.只要潜在进入者数目相对在位企业数目足够多,即使存在寻租的情况,放松管制仍然可以提高社会福利.这从一个角度解释了为什么我国在目前行政管理体制改革滞后、地方保护主义、权力寻租依然存在的情况下,实行放松管制等经济改革措施能够提高社会福利.更多还原

【Abstract】 In the light of quantitative analysis method and game models,the changes of social welfare caused by deregulation with or without rent seeking were discussed.The results show that if rent seeking does not exist,deregulation will increase social welfare;if rent seeking exists,whether deregulation increases or decreases social welfare will depend on the number of existing enterprises and potential enterprises.This explains the phenomenon of the social welfare improvement with deregulation under the lagging mechanism innovation,local protection,and power renting.The result provides a reference of decision judging for government.更多还原