【摘要】 本文选取了2001—2004年147家因关联交易获得非标准审计意见的上市公司作为样本,建立模型实证上市公司关联交易盈余管理与关联方利益转移的关系。发现关联交易盈余管理的主要目的和结果是关联方从上市公司转移利益;股权集中度与关联方利益转移的关系较为复杂;资产规模越大关联方利益转移的程度越高。政策建议为:限制金字塔多层持股和交叉多重持股,而不是简单地降低股权集中度;在股权分置改革时实行国有股缩股而不是只向流通股股东送股;实行累退投票制度;对股东大会决议的最低股权数做出决定;实行控股股东的债权劣后受偿制度。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper selects 147 listed companies which did not get standard auditing opinion because of related party transactions as sample from 2001 to 2004.By setting up regression model with three independent variables,we got some new findings and our policy suggestion is:First,we need limit listed companies’ pyramid-shareholding and cross-shareholding in order to decreasing the difference of controlling shareholders’ ownership and controlling right.We should not decrease the concentration of stockholder’s equity simply.Second,we should decrease state’s shareholding instead of increasing current-shareholding when we reform shareholding’s circulation problem and let all shares circulate.Third,we may perfect the system of appointing independent directors and carry out the system of decreasing votes progressively.Fourth,we can provider the lowest percent of shares when shareholders resolute in shareholder’s meeting.Fifth,we may implement the system of the last compensate to the controlling shareholder.更多还原