【摘要】 中国股票市场普遍偏好股权融资,但迄今为止尚缺乏理论模型分析,也未与国外的融资顺序理论模型进行比较。我们首先分析了发达经济国家与公司融资相关的理论,然后通过建立理论模型表明中国股票市场之所以偏好股权融资是因为上市公司利用政府为国有企业改革所做的制度性安排,在给定不损失控制权的条件下,使得融资收益最大化,以此剥夺外部股东的权益。本文设计了一个事前约束和事后干预机制,可以把股权融资偏好行为内生化。更多还原

【Abstract】 There is a widespread preference for equity financing in the Chinese stock market but up to now, there still lacks a model of economic theory to analyze this phenomenon and to compare with the pecking order model in advanced market economies. The paper firstly analyzes the relevant theories of corporate financing and then develops a theoretical model, showing that the reason for the equity preference is that listed companies can use of the government’s system for state - owned enterprise reform in order to maximize the benefits of issuing equity under the condition of minimum loss of the right for corporate control, so that they can deprive the benefits of outside shareholders. Finally,the author designs a mechanism with ex ante constraint and ex post intervention, which can make the preferential behavior of equity financing endogenous.更多还原