【摘要】 本文建立了在信息不对称条件下,由激励相容贷款合同构成的信贷市场的信息甄别模型。模型表明,由贷款额度和贷款利率组成的激励相容贷款合同,可以成为信贷市场的完美自我选择机制,信贷配给被消除,信贷市场可以出清,信贷市场存在多合同的稳定均衡状态。更多还原

【Abstract】 The paper suggests an information screening model in perfectly competitive credit markets with asymmetric information in which credit incentive and compatible credit contracts work as perfect self selection mechanism. The model shows that credit markets are clear and credit rationing is eliminated with the characteristic of screening. Thus, multi-contracts equilibrium can be stable in credit markets with perfectly competitive and information asymmetric characteristics.更多还原