【摘要】 在法律体系已经相对完备的情况下,学者把关注的焦点放在了执法层面,并以直接执法成本解释许多法律未能得到有效执行的现象。然而现实中的执法问题,并不仅限于有法不依或执法不严,而经常是执法者在不同时期,针对不同案件有选择性地采取不同的执法强度,既有执法不严,也有过度执法、以政策替代法律的问题。本文的研究表明,这种选择性执法现象,是作为执法主体的政府面临情势变化,为降低包括间接执法成本和间接损害的总成本,运用剩余执法权以保证实现其政治、经济及社会目标的结果。更多还原

【Abstract】 The law-enforcement draws great attention under the background of complete law regime. Most scholars attribute the non-enforcement of law to high direct cost of law-enforcement. Their explanation is of great success except that they ignored one special phenomenon of selective law-enforcement which means the law is always enforced differently under different circumstances. This paper explains it as an intended behavior of government which tries to minimize the total cost including direct and indirect harm, direct and indirect law-enforcement cost with residual rights of law-enforcement to realize its political, economic or social targets when facing different situation.更多还原