【摘要】 在Gonzalez模型的基础上引入经理自主权变量研究企业在R&D投入决策过程中的行为模式,模型不但能够解释企业R&D投入水平高低的决策,还可以解释企业R&D活动启动与否的决策。理论分析与实证数据表明,由于经理与股东之间的偏好和利益存在差异,经理自主权水平的不同对企业R&D投入决策结果将产生显著影响,对于经理自主权越大的企业,启动R&D活动的概率越低,且R&D投入水平越低。就R&D投入现状而言,中国企业的经理自主权普遍偏大,这在一定程度上也揭示了中国企业治理结构中内部制衡的弱有效性,导致以经理为代表的内部人过度控制企业。因而适度控制经理自主权、合理安排经理与股东之间的权力配置是保证有效R&D投入、提升企业技术创新能力的必要手段。更多还原

【Abstract】 Based on Xulia Gonzalez′s R&D expenditure decision model,the paper introduces managerial discretion as a new variable on the behavior mode of R&D expenditure decision.The model can not only explain the decision of expenditure level,but also explain the decision of whether to take R&D expenditure.The model argues that due to the benefit deviation between managers and shareholders,firms with different managerial discretion level will have different R&D expenditure decision.For firms with greater managerial discretion,the lower probability of carrying R&D activity will be,and the weaker strength of R&D expenditure will be.The research results show that the managerial discretion of Chinese firms is too great from the view of R&D expenditure,which shows that the inside balance mechanism on firm governance in China is weak,so that the managers control the firms too much.Therefore to control managerial discretion level reasonably will ensure the effectiveness of R&D expenditure,and improve the technology innovation of firms.更多还原