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对风险投资基金管理者选择的信号博弈分析
On the signaling game of choosing the venture capital fund manager
【摘要】 建立了投资者对风险投资基金管理者的选择博弈模型,结合不完全信息信号博弈的有关原理分析了投资者和基金管理者的策略选择及可能达到的均衡。研究表明,在一定条件满足时速存在着三种效率依次递减的均衡:分离均衡、混杂均衡和共用均衡。要达到效率最高的均衡,必须加大对虚报行为的处罚力度,要加大对基金管理者的评估。
【Abstract】 Applying the signaling game theory,we establishes a capitalist’s choice game model of the venture capital fund manager,and analyzes the capitalist and the fund manger’s choice of the game strategy and the possible equilibrium,.The research shows that on the given conditions there are possible equilibriums whose efficiencies are decreasing: separating equilibrium,semi-separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.we should strengthen the punishment for the claiming fraud and the valuation of the fund manager in order to attain the best efficiency equilibrium.
- 【文献出处】 河北建筑科技学院学报 ,Journal of Hebei Institute of Architectural Science and Technology , 编辑部邮箱 ,2006年03期
- 【分类号】F830.59;F224.32
- 【被引频次】2
- 【下载频次】126