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软预算约束:无穷重复博弈视角
Soft Budget Constraint:An Infinitely Repeated Game’s Perspective
【摘要】 本文在内生性软预算约束理论基础上,引入了无穷重复博弈,并指出在无穷重复博弈中,在一定约束条件下,银行可构造一项触发战略使企业的预算约束得到硬化。本文认为企业不能满足该约束条件是导致软预算约束的根本原因。
【Abstract】 Based on the endogenous soft budget constraint theory, this paper introduces the infinitely repeated games into the Dewatripont-Maskin model. We then show that in the infinitely repeated games model, under certain condition, the bank can construct a trigger strategy, which will harden the enterprise’s budget constraint. We argue that failing to meet the condition is an important cause for soft budget constraint.
【关键词】 软预算约束;
无穷重复博弈;
触发战略;
【Key words】 soft budget constraint; infinitely repeated game; trigger strategy;
【Key words】 soft budget constraint; infinitely repeated game; trigger strategy;
- 【文献出处】 财经科学 ,Finance & Economics , 编辑部邮箱 ,2006年02期
- 【分类号】F224.32
- 【被引频次】7
- 【下载频次】471