【摘要】 尽管在最简单的委托代理模型中研究的激励契约是线性的 ,但是现实中的激励契约往往是凹的或凸的。本文的目的是在一个委托代理的框架内研究改进线性激励契约的曲率。我们规定了一个二阶多项式的激励契约与一个两状态的噪声分布。我们从理论上证明在这些具体规定下 ,作为对线性激励契约的改进 ,最优激励契约在什么条件下应该是凹的或凸的。更多还原

【Abstract】 While the incentive contracts studied in the simplest principle-agent models are linesr, real world incentive contracts tend to be concave or convex. The purpose of the paper is to study the curvature improving on the linear incentive contract in the principle-agent framework. We prescribe a incentive contract of two order polynomial and a two-state distribution of noise. We theoretically prove on what conditions the optimal contract should be concave or convex in these prescriptions when improving on the linear incentive contract.更多还原