【摘要】 分析了利润最大化厂商可以通过改变产品质量方式内生来改变消费者保留价格的三阶段水平差异模型. 在单位周长的圆周城市模型中,厂商在第一阶段进入并选址,第二阶段选择产品质量,第三阶段进行价格决策. 针对一特定的质量成本函数讨论了模型的子博弈精炼纳什均衡,厂商的质量选择策略符合社会最优,但行业过多的进入最终导致质量下降.更多还原

【Abstract】 A three-stages horizontal differentiation model, in which profit-maximization firms change consumers’ reservation prices by changing product quality. In the circular city game with unit perimeter, firms make decisions about entry, reservation price and price in each stage respectively. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is discussed under a specific quality cost function. Although firms’ quality strategies are social optimal, excessive entries reduce product quality.更多还原