【摘要】 作为国有资产所有权的代表 ,政府为什么会放弃国有企业的产权 ?已有的经济学文献有两个基本的解释 :一种认为政府放弃国有企业产权的目的在于提高效率 (简称“效率论”) ;而另一种认为政府是出自财政的压力 ,即停止对亏损国有企业的补贴 ,或出售国有资产增加财政收入 (简称“收入论”)。我们的实证研究否定了“效率论” ,而给“收入论”提供了支持。此外 ,我们的研究还为以下结论提供了依据 :政府对失业和降低控制权收益 (来自对国有企业直接的控制权 )的担心是国有企业民营化或破产清算的重大障碍。因此 ,一个简单的含义是 :采用一个将政府目标函数考虑在内的次优民营化或破产清算方案是明智的 ;同时 ,对政府来说 ,这也许比一个无法实施的最优方案更为可行更多还原

【Abstract】 Why do governments choose to dump state enterprises by privatization or liquidation?Existing research on privatization has not paid much attention to this question.This paper focuses on testing two alternative theories of the issue. One theory explains that governments privatize or liquidate state enterprise in order to enhance efficiency.The other theory explains that increasing government revenue or stopping subsidies to profit losing state enterprises is the motivation.Based on a data set our tests revealed why China rejects the efficiency theory and supports the revenue theory.In addition,we find evidence that the concerns of Chinese government for both unemployment and political benefit of control are important obstacles to privatization or liquidation decisions.A simple implication is that it might be sensible to propose second best privatization or liquidation programs which take government objectives into account and are feasible rather than first best programs which will not be implemented.更多还原