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企业融资决策的博弈分析

Game theory analysis on financing decision in business

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【作者】 李玉丰; 王国成; 王锋;

【Author】 LI Yu feng,WANG Guo Cheng,WANG Feng (School of Business, Beijing Institute of Machinery, Beijing 100085, China)

【机构】 北京机械工业学院工商管理分院!北京100085;

【摘要】 对企业融资决策进行了研究。基于信息非对称性 ,用博弈论方法建立企业融资决策模型。模型结果 :债权融资形成的博弈均衡是高盈利能力企业和低盈利能力企业都能有效融资 ;股权融资形成的博弈均衡是高盈利能力企业被低盈利能力企业驱逐 ,形成“柠檬效应”。最后指出 ,债权融资应当在企业融资结构中占主导地位

【Abstract】 The financing decision system in business is studied. The system is dependent on game theory with the asymmetry of information. After the building of models on the system with logical analysis, the consequence is drawn that the businesses with high profitability and the ones with low profitability form in game equilibrium in the by process of bond financing, while in the by process of stock financing the businesses with low profitability drive the ones with high profitability out of the game, which is called "lemon effect". In the end, bond financing as a dominant measure in business financing is pointed out.

  • 【文献出处】 北京机械工业学院学报 ,Journal of Beijing Institute of Machinery , 编辑部邮箱 ,2001年03期
  • 【分类号】F275.1
  • 【被引频次】7
  • 【下载频次】317
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