【摘要】 激励机制问题是委托 -代理关系中的核心问题 ,文中利用委托 -代理理论对激励机制问题进行了探讨 ,分别给出了对称信息、非对称信息条件下激励机制的有关特征和相关解释。在对称信息条件下 ,激励机制的设计必须满足 :代理人努力的边际收益等于其边际成本。在非对称信息条件下 ,如代理人是风险中性的 ,则可以实现帕累托最优 ;如代理人是风险规避的 ,则帕累托最优不能实现更多还原

【Abstract】 Incentive scheme is the key issue in the relationship of principal agent. In the paper, it is discussed by using the theory of pincipal agent, some properties and explanations are given under symmetric and asymmetric information respectively. The marginal income of the agent’s effort should be equal to its marginal cost in the design of incentive scheme under symmetric information, while under asymmetric information, Pareto optimization can be reached only if the agent is risk neutral.更多还原