【作者】 郭东； 承林； 王海宁； 赵冬华；

【Author】 Dong Guo;Lin Cheng;Haining Wang;Donghua Zhao;School of Mathematical Sciences, Fudan University;Nari Group Corporation;

【机构】 复旦大学数学科学学院； 南瑞集团有限公司；

【摘要】 本文研究弱选择条件下具有结构进化和策略进化的博弈模型的一致性问题。通过引入系统中个体信息传递需要的时滞,推导出各个群落中不同策略占比所满足的Langevin方程组。利用Tto公式,无穷小生成元算子等理论,得到含时滞的Fokker-Planck方程的表达式。研究发现当群落个数取值较大时,时滞虽然不会改变系统平衡点的稳定性,却会影响到达稳定状态的速率。研究结果反映了信息披露延迟时间对于系统动力学的影响。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper studies the consensus of game models with structural evolution and strategic evolution under weak selection condition. By introducing the time lag required for individual information transmission in the system, the Langevin equations of different strategy proportions in each community are derived. Using the Tto formula, the infinitesimal generator operator theories, the expression of Fokker-Planck equation with time delay is obtained. The study shows that when the number of colonies N is large, the time delay does not change the stability of the equilibrium point of the system, but it will affect the rate of reaching the steady state. The results of the study reflect the impact of information disclosure delay time on system dynamics.更多还原