节点文献
独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制研究
Study of the Pollution Control Mechanism for Local Governments on the Dictatorship and Non Dictatorship
【Author】 WU Zhen-xin;WANG Jiao;ZHANG Xue-feng;School of Economics & Business Administration,North China University of Technology;
【机构】 北方工业大学经济管理学院;
【摘要】 污染联控问题的解决是区域间环境保护、经济发展的关键问题,本文从中央政府角度出发,设计了不完全信息下独裁和非独裁地方政府污染联控机制。研究发现:若中央政府不监管,地方政府不能实现污染联控;独裁地方政府存在的必要条件是,独裁地方政府对社会福利的贡献程度大于其他地方政府对社会福利贡献程度的总和;非独裁和独裁地方政府污染联控机制都是占优策略可执行的,且独裁时的社会福利大于非独裁时的社会福利。建议中央政府在区域污染联控机制设计中,利用一些省市的区位优势,发挥具有独裁特性的地方政府在污染联控中的作用,实现区域社会福利最优。
【Abstract】 The solution to the problem of pollution control is the key problem of the regional environmental protection and economic development.Dictatorial and non-dictatorial pollution control mechanism for Local Governments are designed under incomplete information.The conclusion shows that:The local government can not achieve the joint control under the condition of non-supervision.The condition of the existence of dictatorship is that the contribution of the dictatorial local government to the social welfare is greater than the sum of the contribution of others to the social welfare.The pollution control mechanism under the condition of the dictatorship and the dictatorship are both implementable in dominant strategy,but the social welfare of the dictatorship is greater than that of the non dictatorship.In the design of regional joint control mechanism of pollution,the central government should take advantage of the regional advantages of some provinces and cities,and guide some dictatorial local government to play a role in the regional pollution control,so as to achieve the best overall social welfare.
- 【会议录名称】 第十八届中国管理科学学术年会论文集
- 【会议名称】第十八届中国管理科学学术年会
- 【会议时间】2016-11-12
- 【会议地点】中国陕西西安
- 【分类号】X321
- 【主办单位】中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会、西安交通大学、中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院、《中国管理科学》编辑部