【作者】 张雪峰； 王娇； 吴振信；

【Author】 ZHANG Xue-feng;WANG Jiao;WU Zhen-xin;School of Economics &Business Administration,North China University of Technology;

【机构】 北方工业大学经济管理学院；

【摘要】 本文从中央政府的角度出发,分析了污染治理的外部性会带来市场的非效率,研究了地方政府污染联控机制在占优均衡与子博弈精炼纳什均衡下的执行问题。研究发现:市场效率损失来源于私有信息与机制设计者的监管力度不够,得到了纳什均衡下机制执行的充分必要条件,并构建了一个动态机制来实现污染联控问题,同时通过非对称信息的引入,给出了占优均衡下机制实现目标的方式。更多还原

【Abstract】 From the perspective of the central government,the inefficiency of the market brought by the externality of pollution control,and the implementing of joint control mechanism for the local government in dominant strategy equilibrium and sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium are analyzed.The study found that market efficiency loss came from private information and inadequate supervision of the mechanism designers,and the sufficient and necessary conditions of implementing mechanism in Nash equilibrium mechanism are obtained,also a dynamic mechanism to realize the joint control of regional air pollution is built.At the same time,through introducing the asymmetric information,we gave the way to achieve the goal in dominant equilibrium.更多还原