【作者】 李新然； 何琦； 吴义彪； 陈蓉；

【Author】 LI Xin-ran;HE Qi;WU Yi-biao;CHEN Rong;Faculty of Management and Economics,Dalian University of Technology;

【机构】 大连理工大学管理与经济学部；

【摘要】 本文构建了由制造商作为Stackelberg博弈领导者和零售商作为跟随者的分散式决策闭环供应链模型,研究了在产品最大市场需求规模受到突发事件干扰的情况下,闭环供应链各成员的应急决策问题。研究表明:相比稳定环境下的最优决策,当需求扰动发生后零售商应按产品最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向调整产品的单位零售价格,而产品的订货量和废旧品的回收率在一定的鲁棒区间内可以保持不变,当仅当市场需求扰动的程度突破一定阀值时,才应按最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向对它们进行相应地调整;与此同时,制造商可保持废旧品的单位转移价格一直不变,而仅需按照最大市场需求规模发生扰动的方向对单位批发价格进行相应地调整。更多还原

【Abstract】 Decentralized decision closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model which the manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader while the retailer acts as the Stackelberg follower,is constructed and the optimal emergency decisions of the CLSC system members in which the largest product market demand scales are disrupted by the emergency events are analyzed.The results indicate that compared with the optimal pricing and production decisions in original environment,sales price should be adjusted along the same direction with the disruption of the largest product market demand scales.Moreover,the optimal production quantity and return rate have some robustness under the demand disruption,and only when the disruption is larger than a threshold should both of the values be adjusted along the same direction with the demand disruption.Simultaneously,the manufacturer should just adjust the wholesale price along the same direction with the disruption of the largest product market demand scales,and keep the unit transfer price of the returned product from the retailer remaining unchanged.更多还原