【作者】 刘亭立； 石倩倩； 杨松令；

【Author】 LIU Ting-li;SHI Qian-qian;YANG Song-ling;Schoot of Economics and Management,Beijing University of Technology;

【机构】 北京工业大学经济与管理学院；

【摘要】 本文将上市公司大股东关系纳入股东控制权的研究视野,结合社会资本理论,提出积极股权联盟度量控制权配置的思路,并以我国2008至2013年沪深A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了积极股权联盟对董事会监督效果的影响。研究发现,由积极股权联盟控制的公司,其董事会监督效果显著更好;第一大股东主导积极股权联盟时,股权集中与股权制衡更易达到平衡点,从而有助于提升董事会监督效果;积极股权联盟中股东数量越多,持股比例越低时,董事会监督效果越好,这主要归因于积极股权联盟实现了社会资本的最优配置。更多还原

【Abstract】 Large shareholders’ relationships of listed companies are introduced into the research field of shareholder’control.By combining with the social capital theory,the measurement of active ownership allianceis,and proposed the effect of active ownership alliance on the board supervisionwith is empiric studied a sample of China’s A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2013.It’s found that the board supervision of companies controlled by active ownership alliance would be significantly better.When the largest shareholder is included in the active ownership alliance,both ownership concentrationand ownership balanceare more likely to reache quilibrium.And the board supervision would be more efficient under the condition of the active ownership alliance with more active shareholders and less shareholding ratio,which primarily because the active ownership alliancerealizes theoptimal allocation of social capital.更多还原