【作者】 钟根元； 骆建文； 周斌；

【Author】 ZHONG Gen-yuan LUO Jian-wen ZHOU Bin (Aetna School of Management,Shanghai Jiaotong Univetsity,Shanghai 200052,China)

【机构】 上海交通大学安泰管理学院；

【摘要】 该文章运用微观经济学、博弈论等理论和方法探讨了在国内企业处于完全信息且先后决策的假设条件下,面对进口国政府的反倾销国外企业对商品出口或对外直接投资决策如何抉择问题;建立了绕过反倾销的可能引起对外直接投资的最小反倾销税率模型;得出了该反倾销锐率与国外企业在国内外生产产品的单位边际成本及进口国市场所用收入税税率有关以及进口国政府不能确定过高的反倾销税率等结论。更多还原

【Abstract】 This paper examined the contingent measures between goods export and FDI in the presence of anti-dumping under complete and dynamic game by means of microeconomics and game theory;established the tariff-jumping minimal anti-dumping duty rate model which may cause FDI of foreign firms;concluded that the anti-dumping duty rate concerns domestic and foreign unit marginal costs and the foreign income tax rate,and domesticgovernment cannot determine excessive high anti-dumping duty rate and so on.更多还原