【作者】 陈其安； 杨秀苔；

【Author】 CHEN Qi-an,YANG Xiu-tai(The College of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University , Chongqing 400044,China)

【机构】 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院；

【摘要】 本文以有关心理学理论为依据,建立数学模型研究委托人和代理人过高估计公司信息质量条件下的连续时间委托-代理理论,并分析这种过度自信对委托-代理关系的作用机制。研究表明,最优补偿合同由两部分组成:代理人的保留财富价值和代理人在合同存续期内的努力工作成本;而次优补偿合同由四部分组成:代理人的保留财富价值、努力工作成本、风险溢价和未预期到的意外收益。委托人和代理人在公司信息方面的过度自信偏差都将提高代理成本、恶化道德风险问题。因此改善委托-代理关系的一个有效途径是,委托人自己首先要在公司信息问题上保持理性,其次是要雇佣在公司信息质量方面同样理性的代理人,使委托人和代理人双方都尽可能无偏地估计公司信息的信息价值。更多还原

【Abstract】 On the basis of the relevant psychology theory, this paper researches the continuous-time principal-agent theory under the condition that the principal and agent overestimate the quality of the firm common signal related to its real outcome process by setting up an appropriate mathematical model, and analyses the impact mechanism of this overconfidence bias on principal-agent relationship. The result shows that the first-best compensation contract consists of the following two parts; the agent’ s reservation level of final wealth and her effort cost of exerting continuously the constant first-best effort level, and the second-best compensation contract consists of the following four parts: the agent’s reservation level of final wealth, her effort cost of exerting continuously the constant second-best effort level, her compensation risk premium and the unexpected outcome at the end of period. The overconfidence bias of the principal and agent on the would firm ’ s common signal quality of increase agency cost and worsen the moral hazard problem. Hence, an effective way of improving the principal-agent relationship is that the principal himself must keep rationality on the firm ’ s common signal’ s quality at first, and then hire the rational agent on this aspect, thus ensure a rational assessment of the firm common information as unbiased as possible.更多还原