【作者】 孔峰； 刘鸿雁； 乞建勋；

【Author】 KONG Feng, LIU Hong-yan, QI Jian-xun(Dept. of Economics and Administration, North China Electric Power University, Baoding 071003 ,China)

【机构】 华北电力大学经济管理系；

【摘要】 股票期权激励和受限制性股票报酬是目前世界上常用的长期激励报酬形式,而企业经理却认为传统上使用的B-S公式对股票期权的估价“太高”,相对于“价值相同”的受限制性股票,经理更愿意接受受限制性股票。我们通过经理获得这两种报酬的效用模型的比较,分析了风险厌恶型经理对股权报酬以及受限制性股票的估价,并进一步估计了企业向经理提供股权报酬的绝对损失。从而解释为什么经理股票期权的激励效果不佳的问题。更多还原

【Abstract】 Stock options and restricted stock compensations are two desirable ways of long-run motivations. However, there is not a very appropriate valuation method for these stock-based compensations to risk-averse managers. This paper puts forward a new valuation method for these stock-based compensations. Using this new model, the paper compares the different deadweight costs of awarding risk-averse with stock options and restricted stock compensations , and finds that managers prefer restricted stocks more than equivalent stock options.更多还原